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ABSTRACT
Between 2006 and 2011, daily print newspapers in the U.S. lost 20% of their paid subscribers, partly due to
increasing availability of alternative sources of news, such as free content provided on newspaper websites and
by news aggregators such as Yahoo. However, contrary to the expectation that firms respond to softening
demand by lowering prices, newspapers increased subscription prices by 40-60% during this period. In this
paper, we explain and quantify the factors responsible for these price increases. We calibrate models of
readership and advertising demand using data from a top-50 U.S. regional print newspaper. Conditional on
these demand models, we calibrate the newspaper’s optimal pricing equations, and assess whether the increase
in subscription prices are mainly rationalized by: a) the decline in readers’ willingness to pay (WTP) in the
presence of heterogeneity among subscribers, or b) the newspaper’s reduced incentive to subsidize readers
at the expense of advertisers, due to softening demand for newspaper advertising. We find that the decline
in the ability of the newspaper to subsidize readers by extracting surplus from advertisers explains most of
the increase in subscription prices. Of the three available subscription options (Daily, Weekend, and Sunday
only), subscription prices increased more steeply for the Daily option, a pattern consistent with the view
that newspapers are driving away low valuation weekday readers while preserving Sunday readership and
the corresponding ad revenues. Thus, our research augments theoretical propositions in two-sided markets
by providing a formal empirical approach to unraveling the relative importance of the role played by agents
on the subsidy and demand side in determining prices.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
The U.S. newspaper industry is facing unprecedented challenges due to dramatic losses in revenue
and profitability. As a result of increasing availability of free news content through newspaper
websites and news aggregators such as Yahoo, readers are becoming less willing to pay for the
print newspaper (Fallows, 2010; George, 2008). At the same time, U.S. newspaper publishers have
responded by increasing subscription prices by 40-60% during this period.1 This is counterintuitive
because declining willingness to pay (WTP) and the associated higher price elasticity typically
render it optimal to lower prices (Tirole, 2007). Furthermore, as two-sided platforms, newspapers
derive their revenue from both readers and advertisers, with traditionally 80% coming from the
latter. Since ad revenue is tied to readership, raising prices might accelerate the decline in print
circulation and further erode advertising revenues.2
A common explanation for increasing prices, even with declining overall WTP, is that firms
strategically set prices to exploit differences in WTP among consumers (Hauser and Shugan, 1983).
Decline in the overall WTP for the print newspaper might have led to a situation where a subset
of readers with very low WTP is not profitable to serve. Consequently, the higher margins realized
by catering only to high WTP readers might offset losses in profits from not serving low value
readers. In fact, several highly-publicized industry reports (Weber and Poyar, 2012; Filloux, 2012)
have claimed that newspapers’ price-based segmentation strategies on the reader side are primarily
responsible for the steep increase in subscription prices.
A second, heretofore under-investigated rationale for the increase in subscription prices stems
from the two-sided nature of the newspaper industry. Since advertisers are believed to value access
to readers more than readers value newspaper advertising, newspapers have historically subsidized
readers and extracted premium prices from advertisers (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Gabszewicz et al.,
2005; Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005). However, the advent of alternative media options such as
search advertising has made print newspapers less attractive to advertisers. Thus, advertisers’
waning preference for print newspaper advertising might have lowered newspapers’ incentive to
1As we discuss subsequently, the changes in marginal costs cannot explain the 40-60% increase in subscription
prices during this period. Also, commonly used quality metrics (Berry and Waldfogel, 2010) such as the size of
the newsroom and the average number of newspages have declined over time. Therefore, increase in quality cannot
explain the price increases either.
2Report “Circulation Pricing” dt. Mar 17, 2009 retrieved from the NAA’s website: www.naa.org.
1
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1 INTRODUCTION
subsidize readers at the expense of advertisers.3
In this paper, we empirically examine whether (a) changes in the overall WTP among readers
in the presence of heterogeneous preferences, versus (b) a lower incentive to subsidize readers as a
result of declining preference for print advertising on the advertiser side, predominantly drove the
increase in subscription prices. We use unique data from a top-50 regional U.S. newspaper that
serves a large metropolitan area. Our data span 72 months, from January 2006 through December
2011, and contain the following pieces of information:
1. Monthly print subscriptions and prices for the three most popular options: Daily, Week-
end, and Sunday only, corresponding to print newspaper subscription on all seven days,
Fri/Sat/Sun, and Sunday, respectively. These data are broken down geographically by the
sub-markets (counties) served by the newspaper. We augment these data with subscription
information for a sample of individual subscribers. These data provide us information on
switching behavior between these subscription options, as well as the outside option of no
subscription, over time. Access to sub-market and option-level subscription data as well
individual-level data enables us to characterize the readership demand model and identify
heterogeneity in readers’ willingness to pay for the newspaper, and account for reader substi-
tution across options.
2. Monthly data on print advertising revenues and ad rates on the three types of advertising,
displays, inserts, and classifieds, to inform a model of how demand for each type of advertising
changes with ad rates and readership. In addition, access to data spanning several years
enables us to infer how advertising demand changed from year to year as a result of exogenous
changes in competition in the advertising market.
We propose a model that describes the behavior of three sets of agents: readers, advertisers,
and the newspaper. Readers choose between one of the three available subscription options or the
outside option of not subscribing to the print newspaper. Advertisers choose the amount of adver-
tising to place in the three possible advertising types. Conditional on readership and advertising
3A third explanation is that when newspapers increase print subscription prices, they also consider the consequent
migration of print readers to the online newspaper. For newspapers, such as ours, that do not operate newspaper
paywalls, the migration of readers can bring in additional online advertising revenue even if these online readers do
not directly generate subscription revenues. We subsequently show that this explanation does not rationalize the
steep print subscription price increases (in section 6.4.1).
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demand, the newspaper sets both subscription prices for readers for the three subscription options
and ad rates for each advertising type. We estimate the readership and advertising models using
GMM while accounting for the simultaneity of the decisions made by readers, advertisers, and the
newspaper by employing appropriate exclusion restrictions. Conditional on the estimated reader-
ship and advertising demand model parameters, we compute the optimal price-cost margins derived
under the assumption of profit maximization. We then calibrate the pricing equation by matching
the observed prices with the optimal prices in order to infer the marginal cost. We evaluate the
optimal pricing rule via out of sample validation. We then compare these price-cost margins under
alternative scenarios to assess the extent to which the two competing explanations rationalize the
increases in print subscription prices.
Based on our calibration of the readership demand model, we find a decline in the intrinsic
preference to subscribe to the newspaper, with the decline being more pronounced for the Daily
option. Estimates from our advertising demand model point to a declining intrinsic attractiveness
among advertisers for print newspaper advertising, suggesting a possibly weakening incentive to
subsidize readers at the expense of advertisers.
Based on our estimates from the readership and advertising demand models, we compute the op-
timal subscription and advertising price-cost margins and calibrate the subscription pricing model.
We find that the pricing model predicts the prices in the holdout period with reasonable accuracy,
suggesting that the proposed model is appropriate. Our results suggest that the increase in sub-
scription prices were solely driven by the newspaper’s strategic decision to increase its price-cost
margins on the reader side, rather than due to increase in cost. Moreover, we find that the decline in
WTP among readers in the presence of heterogeneous preferences explains only a small fraction of
the increase in subscription prices. On the other hand, over 90% of this increase can be traced back
to a declining incentive to subsidize readers at the expense of advertisers due to waning interest in
print advertising, which was possibly driven by exogenous changes in the competitive environment
(i.e., after accounting for changes in ad rates and readership).
Overall, our findings provide key insights into the functioning of newspapers. When the tradi-
tional newspaper model was to maintain a large readership base, it made sense to keep subscription
prices relatively low, while charging advertisers premium prices for access to readers. However, after
years of declining circulation, it is optimal for print newspapers to move towards a more balanced
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subscription-cum-advertiser funded model.4 Thus, as advertising continues to decline, a premium
pricing strategy aimed at charging its readers higher prices is possibly the way forward for newspa-
pers.5 The broader finding that a downward shift in the demand curve on the advertising side can
have implications for pricing on the readership side is consistent with the theoretical predictions in
the literature (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2003). However, our research is about both documenting
the direction of the results (i.e., a downward shift in the demand curve on the advertising side can
have implications for pricing on the readership side), as well as quantifying the relative magnitude.
In this regard, it is surprising that the advertising side (rather than the changes on the reader side)
played such a dominant role in driving subscription prices. Therefore, our quantification of the
relative importance of the advertising side vis-à-vis the reader side is not imminently obvious or
guessable without a formal empirical investigation. In that sense, we augment theory by providing
a formal empirical approach to unravel the relative importance played by agents on the subsidy
versus demand side, in determining prices in a two-sided market. Towards the end of the paper, we
discuss some possible implications of our findings beyond the specific context of our investigation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we briefly provide a conceptual back-
ground to our research question. Section 3 describes the data used in the estimation and provides
descriptive evidence as a motivation for our research question. In section 4, we discuss details of
our proposed model. Section 5 discusses identification and the estimation strategy. Results from
the model and robustness checks are presented in section 6, and section 7 concludes.
2 Conceptual Background
Our research is related to two emerging streams of literature: work studying the impact of consumer
heterogeneity on firms’ pricing decisions and literature on pricing in two-sided markets.
Our first explanation for the observed price increase is the commonly advanced one related to
heterogeneity in WTP among readers. In contexts where customers exit the market subsequent
to making a purchase, the trajectory of optimal prices would increase (decrease) over time if high
4Print newspaper circulation has recently encountered an all time low. The last time newspaper circulation
was at current levels was in the mid-1940s, when the population of the U.S. was half its current size - see
http://www.journalism.org/node/1414.
5http://www.thedrum.com/news/2011/09/19/guardianrsquos-editor-chief-robustly-justifies-his-newspaperrsquos-
latest-cover
4
2 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
WTP consumers have an incentive to purchase early (late). In the context of video games and
game consoles wherein high WTP consumers tend to purchase early, Nair (2007) and Liu (2010)
argue that firms face a shrinking market and a remaining pool of low WTP buyers over time. As
a result, firms employ inter-temporal price discrimination by initially charging premium prices to
high WTP customers and reduce prices subsequently to serve the low WTP consumers. In contrast,
in his investigation of airline ticket purchases, Lazarev (2013) documents that high WTP business
travelers tend to purchase their tickets later to reduce the uncertainty around their travel. In such
a scenario, airlines find it optimal to increase prices over time.
In settings where customers make repeat purchases, the optimal price trajectory would respond
to the changing composition of customers, possibly due to the entry of new alternatives. For exam-
ple, Frank and Salkever (1997) and Ching (2010) show that prices of branded pharmaceutical drugs
can increase when generics enter, although consumers are, on average, less willing to pay premium
prices for branded drugs. They argue that with the entry of generics, price sensitive customers
switch to cheaper generics. As a result, branded drugs serve only the high WTP consumers, which
renders it optimal to increase prices subsequent to the entry of generics. Hauser and Shugan (1983)
offer a similar rationale for why it might be optimal to increase prices in response to competitive
entry. Our reasoning is similar: the decline in the overall WTP for the print newspaper, possibly
due to the availability of alternative sources of news, might have rendered it unprofitable to serve
low WTP readers. Consequently, higher margins realizable by catering only to high WTP readers
should offset profit losses from not serving low WTP readers.
We draw our second explanation for increasing subscription prices from theoretical propositions
in the literature on two-sided markets. Since newspapers derive their revenues from two sources,
i.e., readers and advertisers, with at least one side valuing the presence of the other, they operate in
two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). An implication of two-sidedness is that the markup
on one side will depend on the elasticity of the response on both sides of the market and the markup
charged on the other side (Rysman, 2004; Kaiser and Wright, 2006; Wilbur, 2008; Song, 2012; Fan,
2013). As a result, theoretical work in the area of two-sided markets (Parker and Van Alstyne,
2005; Rochet and Tirole, 2003) predicts that the prices on one side (e.g., reader) may be subsidized
at the expense of the other side (e.g., advertiser). An implication of this cross-subsidy is that a
change in the demand characteristics on one side of the market can trigger an adjustment in the
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optimal price charged on both sides of the market.
In the context of newspapers, Seamans and Zhu (2014) empirically document that a negative
shock to the advertising side (the entry of Craigslist into the newspaper’s local market) is associated
with increase in subscription prices. In a related paper, Angelucci et al. (2013) investigate the
effect of heightened competition in newspapers’ advertising markets, on their incentive to price
discriminate between subscribers. Our research adds to the findings in Angelucci et al. (2013) and
Seamans and Zhu (2014) on several dimensions. First, unlike Angelucci et al. (2013) and Seamans
and Zhu (2014), we have access to rich set of readership and advertising data, which enable us to
characterize readership and advertising demand functions and how they have evolved over the years.
Consequently, we are able to quantify the extent to which changes in the readership vs. advertising
demand contributed to the increase in subscription prices. Note that Angelucci et al. (2013) and
Seamans and Zhu (2014) consider only the effect of changes in advertising side that might have
been induced by breaks in the competitive environment (as opposed to actual changes in demand)
on subscription prices. Furthermore, we have readership and advertising demand data broken
down to the level of various options (such as newspaper subscription options, as well as display,
inserts, and classifieds advertising). This enables us to understand the extent to which changes in
demand at individual subscription and advertising options led to the increase in subscription prices,
and thus make richer comments regarding newspaper pricing and product portfolio management
decisions. Finally, a substantive difference is that both Angelucci et al. (2013) and Seamans and
Zhu (2014) investigate newspaper markets prior to 2006, which reflected a relatively stable period
in the industry. On the other hand, we motivate our study based on the dramatic changes in the
newspaper industry, especially related to advertising and readership demand since 2006, the year
that commenced the newspaper’s most pronounced advertising trough (see Edmonds et al., 2013).
3 Data
The data used in our empirical analysis come from a leading regional U.S. newspaper that prefers
to remain anonymous. The data span 72 months from January 2006 through December 2011. The
newspaper ranks among the top 50 in the country by paid circulation and is a local monopoly in
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its market.6 The firm also operates an online news website that was free for readers during the
period of our analysis, with ad revenues from the newspaper’s website accounting for less than 5%
of the firm’s total revenues.
On the readership side, we use aggregate circulation data at the level of the newspaper’s three
most popular subscription options. These data consist of monthly information on paid subscriptions
for the newspaper’s five major sub-markets (top five counties by circulation) for the three most
popular subscription options: Daily, Weekend, and Sunday only. Subscribers residing in these
sub-markets accounted for 93.4% of the newspaper’s total subscription base, and the newspaper’s
top three subscription options accounted for 95.6% of its paying subscribers. Although the total
circulation of newspapers typically consists of paid subscriptions and single-copy (newsstand) sales,
we have data at the sub-market level only for subscriptions. Hence, we use subscription data as
a proxy for readership in our empirical analysis.7 Subsequently, we investigate the robustness
of our results to the inclusion of single-copy sales as an additional choice option for readers. In
addition to these aggregate data, we have monthly subscription information for a random sample
of households (details below). As we discuss subsequently, we augment our estimation by using
these individual level data in conjunction with the aggregate data to aid in the estimation of the
readership heterogeneity distribution.
While our aggregate circulation data are at the sub-market (county) level, subscription prices
do not vary at this level of disaggregation. For each subscription option, the firm charges different
prices to readers residing in regions within vs. outside the newspaper’s core market.8 In our data,
two counties fall within the core market and account for 80-85% of subscribers. The remaining
three counties fall outside the core market. We compiled monthly subscription prices for each
option within and outside the core market from the Alliance for Audited Media’s Audit Reports.
On the advertisering side, we have data on monthly ad revenues and rates on the print news-
paper in three advertising formats: a) display advertising, b) newspaper inserts, and c) classifieds
advertising. These three advertising types constitute over 96% of newspapers’ advertising revenues.
6Blair and Romano (1993) and Dertouzos and Trautman (1990) report that most daily newspapers exist as the
only published newspaper in their local markets.
7Henceforth, we use the terms subscription, readership, and circulation interchangeably.
8The newspaper industry employs a dichotomous geographical classification of its circulation counties: within and
outside the “newspaper designated market” (termed ’core market’ and ’outside the core market’ in this paper, to
simplify exposition).
7
3.1 Descriptive Analyses 3 DATA
Advertisers that opt for display advertising are generally business establishments with pre-specified
advertising budgets. Classifieds advertisers, on the other hand, are usually small business owners
or individuals who prefer to post information about products (e.g., “for sale-telephones”, “wanted-
kitchen appliances”) or services (e.g., “moving services”, “truck rental”). There is generally very
little overlap between newspapers’ display and classified advertising revenue streams (Seamans and
Zhu, 2014). A majority of advertisers that purchase newspaper inserts include grocery stores and
retail establishments (Smith and Wiltse, 2005). Further, across the three types, there are differ-
ences in ad placement/ad appearance. While display ads include graphics/firm logos and typically
go alongside newspaper editorial text, classified ads generally appears in a pre-specified section
of the newspaper (the “Classifieds” section). Newspaper inserts, which generally include product
information or intimate consumers about promotions, appear as a separate add-on to newspapers.
Although our research question is motivated by the industry-wide phenomenon of increasing
print subscription prices, the data used in our empirical analysis come from one newspaper. We
assess the representativeness of the focal newspaper by considering the temporal patterns in the
total circulation and advertising revenues of the focal newspaper with those for all U.S. newspapers.
To this end, we collected the data on the U.S. print newspaper industry from the Newspapers
Association of America (website: www.naa.org). The temporal patterns in Figure 1 suggest that
the trends in circulation and advertising revenues reflect the general state of the U.S. newspaper
industry. Furthermore, the correlation in both total circulation and advertising revenues of the
focal newspaper with those metrics for all U.S. newspapers is high (0.967 and 0.998 respectively).
Together, these data patterns suggest that the focal newspaper is representative of the population
of U.S. print newspapers.
3.1 Descriptive Analyses
3.1.1 Readership Data
As discussed before, our readership data contain information on newspaper subscription for the
three most popular subscription options at its five major sub-markets (counties). Access to dissag-
gregate readership data enables us to explore differences in subscription behavior across options
and sub-markets. During the period of our analysis (i.e., 2006-2011), 14% of households in the
newspaper’s market subscribed to the focal newspaper. Cross-sectionally, the core market con-
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tained a higher percentage of subscribing households (18.9%) than regions outside the core market
(3.6%). Moreover, subscription prices outside the core market are higher, possibly on account of
higher delivery costs outside the core market.9
Subscription to the Daily option provided home-delivery of the newspaper on all seven days of
the week and is the most expensive option (see section A in Table 1). The Daily option is also the
most popular option among subscribers both within and outside the core market. Conditional on
subscribing to the focal newspaper, 72.4% (71.6%) of readers within (outside) the core market opt
for the Daily option. The corresponding numbers for the Weekend and Sunday only options are
5.4% (4.4%) and 22.2% (23.9%), respectively.
In Section (A) of Table 1, we report the unconditional market share (i.e., number of subscribers
as a proportion of the number of households in each county) for each subscription option. These
results reveal that there is substantial cross-sectional variation in the subscription shares for each
option within and outside the core market. Further, the temporal pattern for subscription shares
in Figure 2 demonstrates that there is significant cross-sectional heterogeneity across the different
sub-markets within the newspaper’s market.
Between 2006-2011, prices for all three subscription options increased steeply. In Table 2, we
present the percentage increase in inflation-adjusted subscription prices over this duration for the
Daily, Weekend, and Sunday-only options, both within and outside the core market. The Daily
option witnessed the steepest price increase of nearly 77%, both within and outside the core market,
while prices of the Weekend and Sunday only options also increased by 52% and 38%, respectively.
Since subscription prices vary by areas within/outside the core market, we plot the share evo-
lution by pooling across sub-markets corresponding to these regions. From Figure 3, we see that
the majority of the decline in print subscriptions arise from within the core market and for the
Daily option, which also has the largest readership base.10 To track the temporal evolution of
option-level circulation at each sub-market, we computed the average annual percentage change
9Newspapers have been restricting delivery to geographic regions with very low demand, to potentially save on
delivery costs to these far flung areas (Mutter, 2009). To assess whether the magnitude of such endogenous/“self-
inflicted” circulation losses is economically significant, we collected annual data for the newspaper at the zipcode
level for our analysis period from the AAM Audit Reports. We found that less than 5% of zipcodes drop out from
the sample over the duration of our data (a zipcode would not figure in our dataset or the AAM’s Audit Reports for
that year if the newspaper stopped serving readers from that zipcode, or if that zipcode accounted for less than 25
subscribers).
10We plot the nominal subscription prices (i.e., pre-inflation adjustment) for each option in Figure 3 for comparison.
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in subscriptions over time at the five sub-markets for all three options and report them in Figure
4. Figure 4 shows that subscription shares for the Daily option decay at a faster rate (between
8-11%) in counties within the core market compared to those outside (between 3-7%). Subscription
shares for the newspaper’s Sunday only option are relatively stable (and even weakly increasing)
especially in counties outside the core market. This suggests that some readers may be substituting
from daily subscription to the cheaper Sunday only subscription over time. On average, across the
three options, the newspaper’s circulation witnessed steep year-on-year declines within (outside)
the core market of between 7-10% (2-6%).
Examining the temporal path of newspaper subscriptions in this market, we conjecture that
readers’ WTP for news might be declining over time, which might have had implications for sub-
scription pricing. Nevertheless, the concomitant increase in subscription prices might also have
contributed to the decline in subscription, i.e., increasing prices drove down demand. While we
cannot definitively state whether decline in intrinsic preference or rising prices contributed to the
drop in subscription without calibrating a demand model with appropriate exclusion restrictions
to pin down the direction of causality, we point the reader to some suggestive evidence. First note
that, of the three subscription options, the Daily option witnessed the greatest circulation decline,
especially within the core market (please see Figure 3). At the same time, the Daily option also
experienced the steepest price increases (77% relative to the 40-50% for the other two options, as
described in Table 2). This suggests that price increases probably played a significant role in driving
subscription down. On the other hand, the Sunday-only option experienced marginal decline or
even growth in subscription despite the increase in corresponding subscription prices, suggesting
that price may not be the main reason why readership demand declined. Subsequently, we use
the estimates from the readership demand model to quantify the relative role of these alternative
drivers in reducing circulation.
In addition to prices, an important driver of newspaper subscription is quality. Researchers
(e.g., Berry and Waldfogel, 2010; Fan, 2013) have used the size of the newsroom and the average
number of news pages as measures of quality. In our application, we use the latter as a control
for quality. Our data on the average number of (non-advertised) news pages varies by subscription
option on an annual basis. The number of news pages decreased by about 27% over our analysis
window, suggesting that the overall quality of the newspaper did not increase over time, thereby
10
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making it less likely that increase in quality drove the price increases.
We augment the aggregate data with individual-level subscription information for a random
sample of 5565 households, accounting for 3.4% of all subscribers. These households were drawn
from the population of subscribers such that each sub-market (i.e., county) was represented pro-
portional to its subscriber base.11 In order to verify whether the individual data are representative
of the population of subscribers, we consider the corresponding (conditional) subscription shares
of the three options. From Table 3 we see that the individual data are fairly representative of the
population of subscribers in this regard. In addition, we also compare the two datasets in terms of
their temporal trajectory. In Table 4, we present the average annual rate of decay in the number of
subscribers for each option for the two datasets. Once again, we find that the the individual data
are representative of the population of subscribers.
3.1.2 Advertising Data
The newspaper sets advertising rates for display and classifieds ads in dollars per column inch of
advertising while ad rates for inserts are in dollars per 1000 newspaper inserts. By dividing the
revenues by these ad rates, we computed the quantity of advertising in terms of the number of
column inches for display and classifieds, and thousands of inserts for pre-print ads. We present
temporal patterns in advertising revenues, rates, and quantity in Figure 5. From the first panel
in Figure 5, we see that the revenues from all three types of advertising declined. Section (B)
in Table 1 presents the firm’s average ad revenues from each of these advertising types in years
2006 and 2011. While display and inserts lost 57.7% and 43.4%, respectively during our analysis
period, Classifieds ad revenues experienced the steepest decline of 88.3%. The steep decline in
display and classifieds advertising has been attributed to the increasing shift in both advertiser
and consumer interest towards non-newspaper media such as Google/Yahoo (Sridhar and Sriram,
2015) and Craigslist (Seamans and Zhu, 2014), respectively. On the other hand, newspaper inserts
have remained relatively stable in the face of external competition primarily due to their higher
targeting ability (Sullivan, 2012; Maynard, 2011).
11In addition to these individual data, we also obtained information on the total number of households in each
county that ever subscribed to any of the three options during the period of our analysis. This helped us identify
the number of households that never subscribed to the focal newspaper in each county. This, in turn, enabled us to
identify the proportional number of non-subscribing households corresponding to the individual data.
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Between 2006 and 2011, classifieds ad rates at the focal newspaper declined by 66%, possibly as
a result of the growing popularity of Craigslist. The rates for display ads and inserts experienced
smaller declines of 16.7% and 10.8%, respectively. As advertisers typically use a cost per reader
(CPM) metric to inform their advertising decisions, we present the CPM for each of the advertising
options in Table 5 to track variations in CPM over the course of our analysis. While the CPM for
inserts was largely stable, that for display (classifieds) increased (decreased) over time.12
4 Model
In this section, we discuss the decisions made by the three agents in our framework: readers,
advertisers, and the newspaper firm. Readers choose one of three newspaper subscription options
(Daily, Weekend, and Sunday only) or the outside option of not subscribing. Advertisers make
quantity choices on the three available advertising types: display, inserts, and classifieds. The
newspaper decides subscription prices for the three options and advertising rates for each of the
three advertising types. Below, we discuss how we model these decisions.
4.1 Readership Model
We begin by specifying the utility that reader i who belongs to sub-market l derives from subscribing
to the print newspaper option m ∈ {Daily (Mon through Sun), Weekend (Fri, Sat, Sun), Sun only}
during month t as:
Uilmt = αilmt + β0 plmt + β1 newspgsmt + ξlmt + εilmt, (1)
where αilmt is the intrinsic preference that reader i living in sub-market l has for subscription to
newspaper option m at time t. plmt is the inflation-adjusted price paid by the reader in sub-market
l for a month’s subscription of option m at time t and newspgsmt is the average number of pages of
news content (i.e., non-advertising pages) available in the newspaper for subscription option m at
time t. We use the number of news pages (or news hole - cf. Fan, 2013) as a proxy for the quality
12We present these numbers considering the total readership of the Sunday newspaper, which is the sum of reader-
ship numbers for the three subscription options that we consider (because each of these options provides newspaper
access on Sundays). Since the remaining six days of the week contribute a significant fraction of ad revenues, we
also explore alternative formulations of readership that internalize different percentage contributions of the Sunday
newspaper towards total ad revenues. The trajectories of CPM calculated using reweighted readership were similar.
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of the newspaper as perceived by readers (Berry and Waldfogel, 2010).13 The indirect utility from
the outside option is normalized to be Ui0t = εi0t. Given the decline in print circulation and the
shift in consumer interest towards outside news options, ex ante, we expect intrinsic preferences
(αilmt) for newspaper subscription to decay over time. The term εilmt is an i.i.d type-1 extreme
value distributed error that captures user i’s idiosyncratic taste for subscription option m at time t.
The term ξlmt captures the effect of aggregate demand shifters unobserved to the econometrician,
but observed by the reader and the newspaper.14 Examples of such unobserved factors include
changes to the newspaper’s popular op. ed. contributor team, which might influence the quality of
news. Unobserved demand shifters could be correlated with prices and the number of news pages,
which might render these variables in Equation (1) endogenous; we control for this endogeneity by
using instrumental variables (described later).
In the econometric model, we adopt a specification for αilmt in Equation (1) of the form:
αilmt = αim + α¯l + γlXlt + δdt It, (2)
where αim ∼ N(αm,Σ) is the time-invariant component of utility that reader i derives from sub-
scribing to option m. The term αm is the mean subscription preference among readers for subscrip-
tion option m and Σ is the covariance matrix of preferences across readers. Since we do not impose
any a priori restrictions on Σ, our specification allows for the possibility that households that have
a high preference for the Daily option also have a higher or lower (than average) preference for
the other subscription options. The term α¯l is the fixed effect for sub-market l. The vector of
sub-market fixed effects accounts for the differences in the mean preference for subscription across
sub-markets. Xlt is a vector of demographic characteristics at sub-market l at time t, that shift the
intrinsic preference for the newspaper. In our specification, we use the time-varying median income
13The number of pages in the newspaper containing ads also dropped by 52% over our analysis window. The
correlation between the number of pages containing news and those containing ads was +0.98. This argues against
the possibility that the newspaper increased the number of ad pages at the expense of news pages (or vice versa),
impacting the newspaper’s quality.
14Since the Daily susbcription option includes access during the weekend and Sunday, it is conceivable that the
error term (i.e., ξ) of the Daily option includes the weekday and weekend structural errors. If such a relationship
exists, the structural errors of the three options would be correlated. The GMM estimation approach that we employ
is agnostic about the correlation among the error terms of the various alternatives. Therefore, the resulting estimates
should not be affected by the presence of such a correlation.
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in each sub-market as a shifter of the intrinsic preference.15 For flexibility, we allow the effect of
the demographic characteristics on the intrinsic preference (i.e., γl) to vary by submarket l.
We allow for temporal evolution in the intrinsic preference by using flexible semi-parametric
controls in the form of year fixed effects (It).16 The temporal evolution of preference for the
newspaper is also clearly influenced by the increased propensity towards internet news consumption.
The year fixed effects capture deviations in the overall subscription preferences above and beyond
changes in (i) consumer demographics, (ii) subscription prices, and (iii) quality of the newspaper.
Since the three subscription options may have experienced different temporal changes in intrinsic
preference, we also estimated an alternative specification that included year-subscription option
fixed effects. However, since our data on the number of news pages varies at the year-subscription
option level, we cannot include this as a covariate in this alternative specification. Therefore,
the year fixed effects in this alternative specification also pick up changes in the quality of the
newspaper.
Since subscription shares decay differentially across sub-markets within and outside the core
market (see Figure 3), we allow the δ’s to vary over time differently across sub-markets within and
outside the core market (d=1, 0 to signal within and outside, respectively). We also allow the
price sensitivity parameter to vary for sub-markets within and outside the core market to allow for
differences in the rate of change of subscription shares.
The specification in Equation (1) assumes that consumers’ utility is not affected by the levels of
advertising in the newspaper. The rationale is that newspaper readers are unlikely to be influenced
by advertising levels because newspaper ads are more easily skipped compared to other media such
as radio (Argentesi and Filistrucchi, 2007; Gabszewicz et al., 2004; Rosse, 1970). We empirically
tested for this by allowing advertising (proxied by total advertising quantity) to influence consumer
utility and found that its effect was statistically insignificant across the various alternative model
formulations that we tested. We provide details of the various alternative model formulations in
Appendix 2. Thus, we assume that advertising levels do not influence readership decisions, an
assumption that also breaks the circularity problem introduced by the cross-dependency between
advertising and readership systems, in determining optimal prices. Furthermore, this is a common
15We compiled these county-level median income data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey
database.
16For identification, we set It for the year 2006 to zero.
14
4.2 Advertising Model 4 MODEL
assumption made by papers studying the newspaper industry (Argentesi and Filistrucchi, 2007; Fan,
2013; Gentzkow, 2007), and motivated by a similar empirical finding that newspaper advertising
quantity does not influence readers’ decisions.
Given our assumption that εilmt follows an extreme value distribution, the probability that
consumer i choses option m is given by:
Pilmt =
exp(αilmt + β0 plmt + β1 newspgsmt + ξlmt)
1 +∑3m′=1 exp(αilm′t + β0 plm′t + β1 newspgsm′t + ξlm′t) . (3)
Our assumption of extreme-value distributed errors generates the following expression for sub-
scription shares for sub-market l and option m:
Sdlmt =
ˆ
ν
exp(αim + βd0plmt + β1newspgsmt + γlXlmt + δdt It + ξlmt)
1 +∑3m′=1 exp(αim′ + βd0plm′t + β1newspgsm′t + γlXlm′t + δdt It + ξlm′t)∂F (ν). (4)
where ν ∼ N(0,Σ). Equation (4) provides the expression for readership subscription shares that
we take to the data.
4.2 Advertising Model
Recall that while the newspaper set the rates for display and classified advertising in dollars per
column-inch, the rates for inserts are set in CPM. As we discuss below, this difference in pricing
structure has implications for how ad rates affect advertising demand, and consequently on sub-
scription pricing. Therefore, we adopt slightly different demand characterizations for the three
types of advertising.
4.2.1 Display and Classifieds Advertising
Similar to Rysman (2004) and Fan (2013), we adopt a constant elasticity specification for the
aggregate demand for display and classified advertising . Formally,
ln(qkt) = µkt + ϕkln(rkt/Rt) + ιkt, (5)
where qkt is the advertising quantity for ad type k{display, classifieds}, which is calculated by
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dividing the ad revenues for each type by the respective ad rates in period t. Recall that we
define quantity in terms of the total number of column inches for display and Classifieds, and
thousands of inserts for pre-prints. The term rkt is the inflation-adjusted advertising rate charged
by the newspaper for ad type k = {1, 2, 3} standing for display, inserts, and classifieds advertising,
respectively at time t. The term Rt is a composite metric for the newspaper’s readership (in
thousands) at time t. Note that we use a composite metric of readership, as opposed to the
readership of the different subscription options because the advertising data are not broken down
by the days of the week for the entire duration of our data. However, for a subset of the period of
our analysis (January 2006 through June 2010, i.e., 54 of the 72 months used in our analysis), we
have advertising data that are broken down by weekdays vs. Sundays. These data suggest that the
Sunday newspaper accounted for 70% to 75% of the overall ad revenues (see Table 7). Therefore, we
construct the composite readership metric using a weighted sum of the readership of the different
subscription options such that the weights satisfy the condition that 75% of the advertising revenue
came from the Sunday newspaper.17,18 We provide further details on this weighting in Appendix 1.
We verify the robustness of our results to alternative assumptions regarding Rt in section 6.4.2.19
Together, rkt/Rt represents the cost per 1000 readers (CPM) incurred in placing ads in the
print newspaper at time t and ϕk captures the corresponding elasticity. Since the CPM is a
composite metric that captures both the cost of placing ads and the size of the audience, advertisers
typically use it to compare alternative media options. The parameter µkt represents the intrinsic
attractiveness of each advertising type k as perceived by advertisers and is allowed to vary over
time to capture exogenous changes in the competitive environment (e.g., the growth of Outdoor and
Internet advertising options). Therefore, while ϕk captures the shape of the advertising demand
17We also examined the sensitivity of our key substantive findings to alternative assumptions regarding the extent of
the Sunday newspaper’s contribution to overall ad revenues, by varying the weights as per the discussion in Appendix
1. We see that our results are robust to various plausible levels of Sunday advertising contribution (50-100%). These
results are available with the authors on request.
18It is conceivable that advertisers respond to changes in the composition of readers. If such dependencies between
advertising and readership do exist, it can have implications for how newspapers set prices. We estimated various
model specifications wherein we included the composition of readers in terms of income, high school education
attainment and English-speaking abilities as an additional covariate in the advertising demand model. We did not
find a significant relationship between the composition of readers and advertising in all these specifications. We thank
the Senior Editor for suggesting this line of investigation.
19We recognize that the proportion of the ad expenditure on Sundays vs. on weekdays is an endogenous decision
made by the advertisers and is likely to be tied to the corresponding readership on these days. Subsequently,
we consider a specification where we use advertising data on weekdays vs. on Sundays to account for differential
responsiveness to weekday vs. Sunday readership. However, because these data are only available for a limited time
period, we do not use this as the main specification, but rather present it as part of a robustness check.
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curve as a function of the CPM, µkt allows this demand curve to shift over time. ιkt is a normal
mean-zero i.i.d error term for advertising quantity.
4.2.2 Newspaper Inserts Advertising
Our specification of the demand for inserts advertising is similar to that for display and classfieds,
albeit with two key differences. First, since the ad rates for inserts are already in CPM, we do
not divide them by readership. Second, the realized quantity of inserts advertising is likely to be
constrained by the circulation of the newspaper. If a newspaper’s circulation drops, so would its
ability to circulate inserts, thereby resulting in lower realized demand for inserts even if the CPM
did not change.20 Therefore, we include the total readership of the newspaper, Rt, as an additional
covariate to capture this capacity constraint. Therefore, the demand for inserts in month t is of
the form:
ln(qk′t) = µk′t + ϕk′ ln(rk′t) + %k′ ln(Rt) + ιk′t, (6)
where k′ indexes inserts. Note that the parameter % captures the relationship between readership
of the newspaper and the demand for inserts advertising, which we conceptualize as the capacity
constraint imposed by the newspaper’s circulation.
In our advertising demand specification, we restrict the cross-price elasticities among the three
types of advertising to be zero. This restriction implies that advertisers do not substitute or perceive
synergies between the three types of advertising. This assumption is partly dictated by the empirical
reality that the CPMs for the three types of advertising are highly collinear, thereby precluding us
from identifying separate own- and cross-price effects. Moreover, the assumption that advertisers
do not substitute between different types of advertising is reasonable in our context because the
three ad types are different in advertising form, the nature of target advertisers and advertising
objective (as discussed earlier). Furthermore, our conversations with managers at the newspaper
revealed that advertisers rarely switch between ad types, suggesting that substitution is unlikely to
be sizable. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that synergies may arise if advertisers employ multiple
types of advertising simultaneously. However, our interviews with managers at the newspaper
20We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insightful observation.
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suggested that a very small proportion of advertisers (<10%) generally invest in more than one
advertising type in each year.
In order to study the role of exogenous changes in the ad market on subscription prices, it is
important to account for the temporal evolution of intrinsic advertising attractiveness of advertising
in each option. The intrinsic attractiveness reflects the relative effectivess of advertising in that
option, as perceived by advertisers; the advent of alternative media options for advertising might
have altered the perceived relative effectiveness of these options over time. We adopt the following
specification for intrinsic advertising attractiveness µkt in our econometric model:
µkt = µk + ϑktYkt + %kY˜ kt, (7)
where the Y kt are advertising type-specific year dummies. As in the readership model, these
year dummies capture changes in advertising levels across years, with year 2006 as base. The
year dummies capture the influence of a wide set of factors influencing ad demand ranging from
the great recession of 2008, to the growing relative popularity of outside options such as search
advertising (Sridhar and Sriram, 2015).21 The term Y˜kt incorporates controls for seasonality in
advertising demand via quarter of the year fixed effects that are specific to each advertising type.
We estimate a common elasticity (ϕ) for the three advertising options during estimation. Ex ante,
we expect the effect of Y kt to decline over time, resulting in the overall advertising demand curve
shifting downwards as a result of increasing competition. Recovering a declining intercept for print
advertising would support the possibility that the decline in advertising subsidy contributed to
price increases faced by readers of the print newspaper as discussed in detail in section 4.3.
21A benefit of using such semi-parametric controls is the reduced reliance on parametric assumptions on the nature
temporal evolution in advertising demand. However, the cost of the flexible specification is is that we are unable to
separate out the individual influence of the effect of the recession and the increasing popularity of the outside option
on ad demand. Furthermore, the effect of the recession is temporary (2008-2009) and we see a consistent decline in
the intrinsic attractiveness for advertising for display and classifieds, even in periods following the recession indicating
that the outside option was indeed gaining in relative popularity over our analysis time frame.
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4.3 Pricing
We now discuss optimal newspaper prices as a function of the readership and advertising demand
parameters. The profit function of the newspaper monopolist can be written as:22
pit =
3∑
m=1
(pNmt − cNmt)RNmt +
3∑
m=1
(pOmt − cOmt)ROmt +
3∑
k=1
(rkt − ωkt)qkt, (8)
where Rmt and pmt refer to the newspaper’s print circulation and subscription price for option
m respectively (with the N and O superscripts indexing within and outside the core market,
respectively) and qkt and rkt refer to the advertising quantity and advertising rate corresponding to
display, inserts, and classifieds advertising. The terms cmt and ωkt refer respectively to the marginal
costs at time t associated with printing and distribution of the newspaper, and the marginal cost of
selling ad space and printing advertising. The first order condition (FOC) for the prices to readers
and advertisers is:
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
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.
(9)
The zeros in the first six columns in rows 7 through 9 in the markup matrix Ω in Equation (9)
22As discussed before in footnote 6, almost all U.S. daily newspapers are local monopolies. However, these local
newspapers may face competition from National newspapers and other news/advertising outlets within their local
markets. The outside option in our demand model helps us account for this competition. However, similar to extant
work (Blair and Romano, 1993; Gentzkow, 2007; Fan, 2013), we assume that price responses to changes in competition
are small.
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are a result of our assumption that the subscription decision does not depend on the quantity of
advertising. The 3 x 3 block of zeros in the off diagonal of the 6 x 6 matrix in the northwest corner
reflect the fact that there is no overlap in readership within and outside the core market. Therefore,
a change in core market subscription prices is unlikely to have an effect on readership outside the
core market. The zeros in the off-diagonal elements corresponding to the last three columns of
rows 7 through 9 are a result of our assumption that advertisers do not substitute between the
three types of advertising (as discussed earlier). Furthermore, note that the ad rates for inserts
are defined per reader. Therefore, a change in readership should not affect the quantity of inserts
other than via the capacity constraint implied by the number of newspapers delivered.
For illustration, we re-write the FOC for subscription option m, m = 1, 2, 3, for the core
market as
(
pNmt − cNmt
)
=
− R
N
mt(
∂RNmt
∂pNmt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
−
∑
m′ 6=m
(pN
m′ t − cNm′ t)
(
∂RN
m′t
∂pNmt
)
(
∂RNmt
∂pNmt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
−
(r1t − ω1t)∂q1t∂Rt ∂Rt∂pNmt(
∂RNmt
∂pNmt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
3
(r2t − ω2t)∂q2t∂Rt ∂Rt∂pNmt(
∂RNmt
∂pNmt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
4
(r3t − ω3t)∂q3t∂Rt ∂Rt∂pNmt(
∂RNmt
∂pNmt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
.
5
(10)
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The FOC from equation (8) with respect to advertising rates for type k are given by:
(rkt − ωkt) = − qkt(∂qkt
∂rkt
) . (11)
Equation (10) governs the subscription pricing rule for the newspaper. Recall that the term cmt
is the marginal cost of serving a reader of subscription optionm at time t and (pmt − cmt) represents
the firm’s price-cost margin. The first term on the right hand side in Equation (10) captures the
23Employing the weights discussed in Appendix 1, we compute the responsiveness of readership to changes in the
price of option m, ∂Rt/∂pmt as a weighted sum of the responsiveness of each option’s readership to a change in price
of option m.
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extent to which the the readership of a subscription option changes with a unit increase in its own
price. The second term captures the positive offset derived from option m readers substituting
to the other two subscription options due to the increase in option m prices. The terms 3, 4,
and 5 correspond to the effect of display, inserts, and classifieds advertising subsidy on option m’s
subscription prices.
The price-cost margin for advertising in Equation (11), i.e., (rkt − ωkt) , is a function of both
the price response of advertising demand (∂qkt∂rkt ) and actual levels of advertising demand (qkt). Since
we assume that readers are not influenced by the levels of advertising in the newspaper, the above
expression does not contain a “direct” effect of readership on ad rates. However, for display and
classifieds, where ad rates are set in the form of dollars per column-inch, the optimal price-cost
margin for advertising will decrease with declining readership. This is because advertising demand
is a function of the advertising rate per reader in equations (5) and (11). The intuition is that
advertising types with flat ad rates become more attractive with greater reach, on account of the
resulting lower CPM. At the same time, larger readership base will also enable the newspaper to
circulate more inserts, if demand exists.
4.3.1 Relationship between Readership/Advertising Demand and Pricing on the Reader
Side
Readership Demand and Subscription Prices
We begin by considering the pricing of a single option without advertising externalities. We discuss
the role of advertising externalities subsequently. The corresponding first order condition will reduce
to the first term in Equation (10). All else equal, a reduction in demand, i.e., Rmt, would render it
optimal to lower prices on the reader side. This is the commonly advanced rationale for lowering
prices when faced with softening demand (Tirole, 2007). At the same time, note that the optimal
price for option m is a decreasing function of how readership responds to subscription prices, i.e.,∣∣∣∂Rmt∂pmt ∣∣∣. In order to understand how a declining intrinsic preference for newspaper subscription
would affect optimal prices via
∣∣∣∂Rmt∂pmt ∣∣∣, consider the simplest case where the market is comprised of
two segments of customers that differ in terms of their WTP with segment 1 comprising of the high
WTP type. The subscription share of option m at time t can be written as Rmt = λ1R1mt +λ2R2mt.
In this representation, λ1 and λ2(= 1−λ1) are the relative sizes of the high and low WTP customer
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segments respectively and R1mt and R2mt are the corresponding shares of subcription option m in
these segments. Under such a scenario, ∂Rmt∂pmt = λ
1 ∂R1mt
∂pmt
+ λ2 ∂R
2
mt
∂pmt
. Given their lower WTP for
the newspaper, we expect that
∣∣∣∂R2mt∂pmt ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∂R1mt∂pmt ∣∣∣. With the arrival of alternative sources of news
over time, low WTP subscribers are more likely to quit the newspaper, leading to lower λ2, and
hence higher λ1 over time. The resulting decrease in
∣∣∣∂Rmt∂pmt ∣∣∣ would render it optimal to increase
subscription prices as low WTP readers quit. The same intuition will apply when we consider
continuous heterogeneity.
Advertising Demand and Subscription Prices
Let us now consider how a shift in advertising demand can influence pricing on the reader side of
the market. From Equation 10, we can see that the optimal level of advertising subsidy (terms 3, 4
and 5 in equation 10) depends on two components: (a) the extent to which attracting more readers
via subsidy brings in additional advertising, i.e., the magnitude of ∂q/∂R, and (b) the margin on
the advertising side that is realized for a unit increase in advertising demand, i.e., (r − ω). Let us
begin by considering the second component: margins on the advertising side. From Equation 11,
we can see that the optimal markup for the advertising side increases with demand. Therefore, a
downward shift in the advertising demand curve (captured by the year fixed effects) would result in
lower advertising demand and hence, lower optimal markups.24 From Equation 10, we can see that
the optimal level of subsidy on the reader side of the market would decrease if (r − ω) decreases.
Therefore, a downward shift in advertising demand can imply higher optimal prices on the reader
side.
Turning to the first component, we can see that higher levels of subsidy on the reader side are
optimal if marginal readers are effective in increasing advertising demand, q. Therefore, the level of
subsidy offered on the reader side would decrease if ∂q∂R decreases over time. Our constant elasticity
specification for the advertising demand implies that ∂q∂R
R
q is a constant. A larger downward shift
in advertising demand relative to readership would lead to an increase in Rq over time. As a result,
∂q
∂R would decrease over time, which in turn, would reduce the effectiveness of subsidizing readers.
Together, these two mechanisms imply that a downward shift in advertising demand would reduce
the marginal benefit from subsidizing readers, and thus render it optimal to increase subscription
24The optimal markup on the advertising side will also be a function of the responsiveness of advertising demand
to CPM, i.e., ∂q
∂r
. In our data, we find that the optimal markup on the advertising side, net of the shift in ad demand
and changes in ∂q
∂r
, decreases during the period of our analysis.
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prices.
Conditional on the readership and advertising demand models, we compute the optimal price-
cost margins as described on the right hand side of Equation (9). Given that we have price
information for all subscription options, the only unknown in Equation (9) is the marginal cost.
Since we are particularly interested in the subscription prices, we estimate the parameters of the
marginal cost only for the readership pricing side. Specifically, we specify the marginal cost equation
as
pmt −Mmt = cmt = χmt + Λmχt + ηmt, (12)
where, Mmt is the markup for subscription option m at time t, as implied by Equation (9), χmt
is a linear time trend that captures temporal shifts in marginal cost for subscription option m, χt
is a vector of factor costs, and Λm are the corresponding parameters. The term ηmt represents
the residual component of marginal cost that is not captured by the year-subscription option time
trends and the cost shifters.
State Dependence and Dynamic Pricing
The readership demand model discussed earlier assumes that there is no state dependence in news-
paper subscription. However, it is conceivable that households that subscribe to the newspaper in
a given period might derive a greater utility from subscription in subsequent periods, possibly be-
cause of acquired taste. In fact, state dependence might arise on account of psychological switching
costs, in the presence of high search costs or consumer learning (Dube et al., 2010) - the latter
two much less likely a significant driver in the market for newspapers. Since our empirical analy-
sis is primarily based on aggregate data, it would be difficult to separate out heterogeneity from
state dependence. Moreover, we follow the practice in the extant research on newspaper industry
(Rysman, 2004; Gentzkow, 2007; Fan, 2013; Seamans and Zhu, 2014) in terms of not considering
potential state dependence in subscription.
If there is indeed state dependence in choice, the optimal pricing decision by the newspaper
would be dynamic, rather than static, as discussed above. The premise is that, in the presence of
state dependence, acquiring a customer can yield long-term payoffs. As a result, the firm would have
an incentive to charge lower prices than those under static scenario in order to acquire customers.
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This incentive to lower prices is likely to be greater when perceived quality is high (Dube et al.,
2008).
In our context, if the intrinsic preference for newspaper subscription is indeed declining as
conjectured, with state dependence, the newspaper’s incentive to charge lower than static prices
is likely to decrease over time. Therefore, declining WTP can lead to higher prices under state
dependence, just as it would in the presence of heterogeneity.25
5 Estimation
5.1 Overview of the Estimation
We estimate a system of three equations: (i) subscription decision by readers, (ii) advertising
decisions by advertisers, and (iii) the newspaper’s decision regarding the prices to be paid by
readers and advertisers. Since the three decisions are likely to have been made simultaneously by
the respective agents, we need to account for the simultaneity of these decisions using instrumental
variables. There are two possible approaches to estimating the system: simultaneously, using a
full information approach, or separately, using a limited information approach. The key benefit of
the full information approach in our context is that it takes a stance on the exact data generating
process on the supply side. If this data generated process is indeed correct, this would result in more
efficient parameter estimates. On the other hand, if the assumptions made in the full information
approach are incorrect, it might result in inconsistent estimates (Nevo, 2000; Villas-Boas, 2007b).
We adopt a limited information approach in our context for the following reasons. First, given
that the limited information approach makes fewer assumptions regarding the data generating
process, it is prone to fewer misspecification errors. Second, as Villas-Boas (2007a) documents,
under general monotonicity conditions, there is a specification of the full information model that is
consistent with an arbitrarily specified limited information model. Third, the main results in the
paper regarding the relative roles of the readership vs. advertising demand on the pricing decisions
are based on counterfactual analyses that depend on the premise that the observed price trajectories
25In a sense, a static demand model may be interpreted as a steady state of a full dynamic model that includes
state dependence. However, it is unlikely that the newspaper market is in steady state owing to the dramatic changes
in the advertising, and to a smaller extent, the reader demand market; a limitation of the static pricing model over
a fully dynamic equivalent. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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are close to optimal. The limited information approach allows us to compare the optimal prices
implied by the estimated readership and advertising demand models with the actual prices in order
to assess the appropriateness of this premise. Alternatively, under a full information approach,
the readership and advertising demand models would be estimated under the assumption that
the observed prices are optimal, which would render such an assessment inappropriate. Finally,
the limited information approach is less computationally intensive to estimate compared to a full
information approach.
We use GMM employing instrumental variables (discussed in the next sub-section) to estimate
the readership demand parameters. The parameters to be estimated in the readership system are:
a) those that characterize the covariance matrix corresponding to the heterogeneity distribution of
subscription preferences for the three options, i.e., the Σ matrix, b) parameters that affect the mean
utility. As regards the heterogeneity parameters, we estimate the elements of the lower-triangular
matrix that corresponds to the Cholesky decomposition of Σ. Since we have three subscription
options, Σ is a 3x3 matrix, which implies that we need to estimate six parameters that characterize
the Cholesky decomposition of Σ. As regards the mean utility parameters, we need to recover the
fixed effects for each subscription option, price sensitivity, responsiveness to changes in news pages,
sub-market (i.e., county) fixed effects, year fixed effects (δdt ), and the effect of demographic shifters
- average income - on readership (γl).
Our estimation is based on aggregate subscription data at the county-month-subscription option
level. We use the the approach proposed by Berry et al. (1995) (hence forth BLP approach) to
estimate the readership demand parameters. With aggregate data, the identification of the mean
utility parameters is relatively straight forward. While researchers have estimated heterogeneity
distribution with aggregate data using the BLP approach, we use additional micro-moments from
individual-level purchase histories to strengthen the case for identification. The estimation approach
that we employ is similar to Chintagunta and Dube (2005) and proceeds in the following steps:
(a) We start with initial guesses of the mean utilities for each county-month-subscription option
combination and estimate the model of individual choices as described in Equation (1) to recover
the parameters of the heterogeneity distribution (i.e., the Σ matrix - see Equation (2)). We employ
maximum likelihood at this stage.
(b) Conditional on the heterogeneity parameters, we use the aggregate data to recover the mean
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utilities via the contraction mapping algorithm in Berry et al. (1995). We then estimate the mean
utility parameters using GMM.
We iterate the two steps (a) and (b) with the mean utilities from the previous iteration of step
(b) acting as the initial guess for the next iteration of step (a). We treat the estimation to have
converged if the maximum absolute difference between two successive values of the mean utilities
in step (b) is less than a pre-sepcified tolerance level.26
In the advertising demand model, the parameters to be estimated are: a) elasticity of advertising
demand to changes in readership adjusted prices (ϕ), b) advertisers’ intrinsic attractiveness for
display, inserts and classifieds advertising, and parameters governing their temporal evolution (the
year dummies corresponding to each advertising type) - µkt. We estimate the advertising demand
parameters using GMM, employing the orthogonality of demand shocks and instrumental variables
as moment conditions. We estimate the readership and advertising demand equations sequentially.
In the pricing equation, we estimate year-subscription option fixed effects and separate param-
eters for the cost shifters for each subscription option. We estimate the pricing equation separately
for within and outside the core market using OLS.27 We calibrate Equation (12) for the first five
years of the data (i.e., 60 months) and use the remaining 12 months of data as a hold out sample
for validation.
5.2 Identification
Our objective is to assess the extent to which changes in the intrinsic preference on the reader side
in the presence of heterogeneous preferences vs. decreasing incentive to subsidize readers at the
expense of advertisers drove the increase in subscription prices. Of these, we conceptualize the latter
as a consequence of the decline in intrinsic preference for print advertising amongst advertisers. We
seek to parse out three components: fluctuations in the intrinsic preference of print subscription
separately from the effects of price and quality changes, heterogeneity in the preference for print
subscription, and changes in the intrinsic preference for print advertising.
There are two key identification issues that we intend to discuss. The first issue is whether there
is sufficient variation in the data to enable us to identify the three components in our estimation.
26In our estimation, we used a tolerance level of 10-6.
27Since the right hand side of the pricing equation is a function of exogenous cost shifters and not demand param-
eters, it may be estimated using OLS (Bonnet et al., 2013; Train, 2009, p. 330)
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The second issue is the simultaneous nature of the decisions made by three agents: readers (sub-
scription decision), advertisers (advertising quantity decisions), and the newspaper (decision to set
subscription and advertising prices and the number of pages of news).
5.2.1 Variation in the Data for Identification
On the readership side, we discuss the identification of the mean utility and heterogeneity parame-
ters. With respect to the mean utility parameters, we are primarily interested in documenting the
temporal changes in intrinsic preference for newspaper subscription. In our specification, we infer
changes in intrinsic preference for subscription semi-parametrically in the form of year fixed effects.
Since we have monthly subscription data, the identification of these year fixed effects in isolation is
relatively straight forward. However, since price and quality (i.e, the number of news pages) changes
occur rather infrequently, the question is whether we can identify these effects separately from the
year fixed effects. Intuitively, both price and the number of news pages vary across subscription
options. Since we estimate a common set of year fixed effects for all subscription options in our
model specification (a), we can identify the price and quality effects separately from these year fixed
effects.28 Moreover, there are instances when subscription prices change multiple times during a
year. This variation helps in identifying the price effect separately from year fixed effects. While
the extent of the available price variation constrains us from identifying heterogeneity in readers’
potential price responsiveness, our specification for readership demand allows for the identification
of heterogeneity in readers’ willingness to pay, which is central to our research question.
To systematically assess whether the actual variation in the data is sufficient to recover the
parameters of interest, we performed a simulation exercise. Specifically, assuming a set of mean
utility parameters, we used the actual variation in the data and the assumption of extreme value
distributed idiosyncratic shocks to simulate individual subscription choices.29 We then estimated
the demand parameters using these simulated data with the objective of recovering the mean utility
parameters, as well as the distribution of heterogeneity in readers’ WTP. In order to understand
how the recoverability varies as we increase the extent of cross-sectional variation, we consider three
scenario: (i) model estimated using data on one option (only the Daily option), (ii) model estimated
28As discussed above, since our data on the number of news pages varies only at the annual level, we cannot
estimate the corresponding effect when we allow for different temporal trends for each subscription option.
29We provide additional details regarding the simulation exercise in Appendix 3.
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using overall market-level data on all three subscription options, and (iii) model estimated on sub-
market (county) level data and three subscription options. Note that the last scenario has the
highest degree of cross-sectional variation and mimics our data. We used 100 replications for each
of these three scenarios.
We report the means, standard deviations and Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) of our recovered
estimates from these 100 datasets for each model in Table A.3 in Appendix 3. These results
suggest that the true parameters fall within the 95% confidence interval of the estimated values.
Furthermore, recoverability improves with the availability/use of greater number of markets and
options, i.e., with more cross-sectional variation. Overall, these results give us confidence that we
can recover the key mean utility parameters, as well as the heterogeneity distribution with the
variation in our data.
On the readership side, we use aggregate subscription data for identification. While researchers
have estimated heterogeneity distributions using aggregate data (e.g., Berry et al., 1995; Besanko
et al., 2003; Nair, 2007; Liu et al., 2010), the argument for identification comes from off-IIA devi-
ations, and is thus closely tied to functional form assumptions. In order to infer the heterogeneity
distribution in subscriber preferences, we use micro-moments generated by the purchase histories
of a sample of individual subscribers in each of the sub-markets (i.e., counties).30 Such micro
data permit the identification of parameters of the heterogeneity distribution, without the need
for distributional assumptions (or off-IIA deviations in choice shares) that may be needed for the
identification from market level data (Berry et al., 2004 p. 73). More specifically, our identification
of consumers’ heterogeneous tastes for newspaper options relies on instances in the data where we
can observe consumers switching between choice options to different extents and over time. To-
gether, these sources of variation help in identifying the heterogeneity distribution on the reader
side, conditional on the mean utility parameters (Berry et al., 2004; Chintagunta and Dube, 2005).
On the advertiser side, we use data on the advertising quantity for each of the three types. We
control for cross-sectional differences across type via fixed effects for each advertising type. The
identification of the change in intrinsic preference for advertising in each type over time is relatively
30As described earlier, the individual data pertain only to households that subscribed at least once during the
period of our analysis. Therefore, in order to match the outside option in the aggregate data (defined based on
non-subscribing households within a county), we simulated a proportional number of households that always chose
the outside option.
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straightforward: while the type specific year fixed effects capture any year-on-year changes in the
corresponding ad demand, the within year controls capture the remaining variation.
5.2.2 Endogeneity
Readership Equation
There are two potential endogenous variables here: subscription prices and the number of news
pages. The endogeneity of prices arises because the newspaper anticipates readership and adver-
tising demand shocks such as periodic sports seasons while setting the respective prices. In order
to break this endogeneity, we need instruments that shift subscription prices and ad rates, but are
not related to the demand shocks.
In order to account for the endogeneity of subscription prices, we use the costs associated with
printing and distributing newspapers as instruments, viz., producer price index for printing ink
manufacturing (NAICS 32591), the cost of output from paper mills (NAICS 32212), and producer
price indices of firms in industries that share similar cost structures, such as book publishers (NAICS
511130). The premise is that while these costs will drive subscription prices, they are unlikely to
be related to the readership demand shocks, conditional on the endogenous variables. Liu (2010)
uses similar instruments to resolve the endogeneity of prices in the video games market. In order
to verify the strength of these instruments, we report the results from the first-stage regression
of the endogenous variables on the instruments in Table 8 section (A). These results suggest that
the instruments, along with other exogenous variables, explain 84% of the variation in prices, with
some instruments exhibiting statistical significance. Compared to the first stage regression without
the instruments, the regression with instruments exhibits a significant improvement in R-squares.
Therefore, we believe that our instruments are relatively strong (Rossi, 2014).
In addition to prices, the newspaper might have changed quality based on demand shocks that
are not observed by the researcher. Similar to the above approach, we account for this potential
endogeneity using cost-based instrumental variables. The premise is that the newspaper’s changing
cost structure might drive the newspaper’s decision on quality (i.e., the number of news pages).
But, as discussed above, these costs should not be correlated with unobserved shifters of readership
demand (e.g., elections, local sporting events etc). The first stage regressions presented in section
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(A) of Table 8 suggest that some of the instruments have a statistically significant relationship with
the number of news pages.
Advertising Equation
Similar to the subscription prices, the newspaper is likely to have set advertising rates in anticipation
of the realized demand shocks. In order to control for this endogeneity, we use instrumental variables
consisting of the factor cost of lithographic/offset printing ink manufacturing (NAICS 325910) and
producer price indices of advertising agencies (NAICS 541810). We collected these data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov). In order to verify the strength of these instruments, we
report the results from the first-stage regression of the endogenous variables on the instruments
in Table 8 section (A). These results suggest that the instruments, along with other exogenous
variables, explain 76% of the variation in ad rates. Compared to the first stage regression with
only the exogenous variables, but excluding the instruments, the proposed instrumental variables
improve the R-squared by 12%. Therefore, we do not believe that our instruments are weak.
The other endogeneity concern in estimating the readership and advertising demand equations
arises from the interlinked nature of these two decisions. Our restriction that advertising quantity
does not influence the subscription decision implies that the readership demand model is identified
without the need for additional exclusion restrictions. On the other hand, readership enters the
advertising demand model as a covariate in the form of the CPM variable (rkt/Rt term in Equation
5). This might lead to an endogeneity problem if factors that are omitted from the advertising
demand equation are also correlated with readership. The premise is that factors such as upcoming
local elections, local events such as restaurant weeks or popular street fairs may increase demand
for local newspaper consumption among readers, as well as for local advertising. Therefore, the
advertising demand shocks are likely to be correlated with readership, thereby resulting in biased
estimates for the advertising demand model.
If the advertising demand shocks are induced by local events, the readership of print versions
of national newspapers in the local market is likely to be a viable instrument. The premise is that
readership of national newspapers is a proxy for preference for print newspaper consumption in the
local market, and should hence be related to the readership of the focal newspaper. However, given
that 76% of advertising for the focal newspaper accrues from local advertisers, it is unlikely that
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readership within the local market of the national print newspapers is related to the demand shocks
for advertising in the focal newspaper, especially, if they represent local omitted variables discussed
above. Since the local newspaper generates 24% of its ad revenue from national advertisers, it is
plausible that the focal newspaper is likely to compete with national newspapers for this part of the
ad revenue. If this is true, then the readership of a national newspaper like the New York Times
will have a direct effect on the focal newspaper’s ad revenues. This would render the conditional
independence assumption required for the validity of instruments questionable. While the focal
newspaper and the New York Times may compete for ad revenue from national advertisers, we
are less concerned about the possibility that this competition will be linked to the readership of
the New York Times in the local market. Our rationale is that the local market is a very small
subset of the target audience for national brands. Moreover, the New York Times derives less
than 1% of its readership from the focal market. Therefore, we contend that national advertisers
are unlikely to make their advertising decisions on the New York Times based on the changes in
its readership in the focal market alone. Consequently, the readership of the New York Times in
the local market is unlikely to be directly related to advertising by national brands in the focal
newspaper. Based on the above rationale, we use the percentage of readers in the local market that
subscribe to the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, as an excluded variable.31 However,
if the advertising demand shocks at the focal newspaper include components that are correlated
with the local readership of national newspapers, such as national elections, the validity of the
instrument is likely to be questionable. In order to minimize this concern, we incorporate strong
temporal controls in the form of year fixed effects for year-on-year changes and quarter of the year
fixed effects for within year changes in our advertising demand models.
However, in the spirit of exploring the robustness of our results to alternative instruments, we
explore alternative instruments that reflects the interest in the local market to consume news. The
premise is that any interest in local news should drive the readership of the focal newspaper. The
corresponding change in advertising should accrue from readership changes (i.e., the interest in
local news is independent of advertising conditional on the readership of the focal newspaper). In
particular, we use Google Trends data on online search propensities in the focal market for keywords
31Note that the demographic characteristics (median county income) also implicitly act as exclusion restrictions
and aid in the identification of the effect of readership on advertising demand.
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relevant to local news (“news”, “<name of the city> news”32). We contend that, taken together,
the search propensities should serve as a reasonable proxy for readers’ interest in consuming local
news content.
We find that the correlation between the subscription of the local newspaper and the local
subscription of national newspapers is 0.8, suggesting that it is not a weak instrument. In addition,
the corresponding correlations between the focal newspaper’s readership and the search propensity
instruments is 0.35 (for “news”) and 0.38 (for “<name of city> news”). We present results from
the first-stage regression of ad rates and readership on instruments in Table 8 section (B).33
Overall, these results suggest that the instruments, along with other exogenous variables, ex-
plain 83% of the variation in readership. Compared to the first stage regression with only the
exogenous variables, but excluding the instruments, the proposed instrumental variables improve
the R-squared by 12-14% for ad rates and 11-15% for readership. Therefore, we contend that we
do not have a weak instruments problem.
Pricing Equation
In order to identify parameters governing the newspaper’s pricing decision separately from the
readership and advertising demand parameters, we need at least one variable each that predicts
the newspaper’s readership and advertising demand, but not the newspaper’s pricing decision.
Time-varying demographic information (median income in each county) and controls for seasonality
(in the form of quarter of the year fixed effects for each ad type) included in the readership and
advertising demand models, respectively, serve as such exclusion restrictions. These enable us to
recover the marginal cost parameters in the pricing equation.
32In order to protect the identity of our data sponsor, which is a major source of print news in its market, we
anonymize the name of the market.
33The strength of the instruments documented based on the first stage regressions are after we account for some
temporal trends in the form of year fixed effects (which are included in our demand model). Nevertheless, there is the
possiblity that within-year variation in the instruments and prices exhibit serial correlation, which could overstate
the strength of our instruments, especially under negative autocorrelation (Granger and Newbold, 1974). We find
no evidence of serial correlation; across our regressions, the Durbin-Watson statistic falls within the range needed to
reject the null hypothesis indicating the presence of autocorrelation (Savin and White, 1977). Detailed results are
available with the authors on request. We thank the AE for suggesting this line of investigation.
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6 Results
6.1 Readership Results
We adopt two alternative specifications for our main readership model: (a) with a common set of
year fixed effects for all subscription options in order to capture the evolution of the overall intrinsic
preference for print subscription and (b) with different year fixed effects for each subscription option
in order to capture separate temporal paths for the intrinstic preference for each subscription option.
However, since our data on the number of news pages varies at the year-subscription option level,
we can include this as a covariate only in the former specification, but not the latter. Therefore, the
year fixed effects in the latter specification also include changes in the quality of the newspaper. In
addition, while we allow the price coefficient to vary across areas within/outside the core market in
specification (a), we include a single price coefficient in specification (b) to explore the importance
of this assumption on our results.34
We report the results from both specifications in Tables 9 and 10. Across both specifications (a)
and (b), the fixed effects corresponding to the three subscription options are negative, indicating
the relative popularity of the outside option. In addition, in line with their relative market shares,
the fixed effect corresponding to the Daily option is least negative, followed by Sunday and then
Weekend. The price coefficients are negative and significant in all specifications. The elements
of the lower triangular matrix corresponding to the covariance matrix of the preferences for the
three subscription options are significant. All the covariance terms in the Σ matrix are positive,
suggesting that households that have a high preference for one subscription option also value other
subcription options.
Many year-dummies are negative and significant in both specifications. Since we use 2006 as the
base year, these results suggest that subscription preferences in subsequent years were lower than
those in 2006. In the specification with common year fixed effects for all subscription options, the
decline in intrinsic preference is pronounced for the counties within the core market. On the other
hand, in the specification with option-specific year fixed effects, the intrinsic preference declined
with respect to 2006 in most cases (with the exception of the Sunday-only option outside the core
market, where it increased in 2010 and 2011). Moreover, the decline appears to be steepest for the
34We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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Daily subscription option within the core market. This pattern is consistent with our discussion
regarding the steeper decline in Daily option readership. However, note that the year fixed effects
in the latter specification include the effect of changes in the number of news pages as well.
Based on the readership demand estimates, we quantify the extent to which changes in intrinsic
preference, price, and quality contributed to the decline in print subscriptions. We perform this
quantification by calculating the subscription volume that would have accrued in 2011 if each of
these factors had remained the same as they were in 2006. For the model with common year fixed
effects (i.e., specification (a)), we find that price was the largest contributor (67%) to the decline
in subscription, followed by quality (11%) and then intrinsic preferences (4%). When we consider
alternative subscription options to have different year fixed effects (i.e., specification (b)), price
increase accounted for 23% of the loss in subscription, followed by 32% for the decline in year
fixed effects.35 Recall that in specification (b), the year fixed effects reflect a composite of changes
in intrinsic preference and the quality of the newspaper. Therefore, a large fraction of the loss in
subscription seems to have been a consequence of the increase in subscription prices as opposed to a
decline in interest in subscribing to the newspaper. However, this analysis does not shed much light
on the extent to which changes in the intrinsic preference played a role in driving up subscription
prices.
6.2 Advertising Results
We present the results from our advertising model in Table 11. The estimated advertising demand
price elasticity ranges between -1.30 and -2.55, which is similar to that reported by Fan (2013)
for a wide panel of U.S. newspapers. The type-specific year fixed effects for display and classifieds
advertising are negative and significant, in conformity with the relatively steep decline in demand
for these two types. Moreover, several of the year fixed-effects are decreasing for these two types
of advertising, suggesting a decline in intrinsic attractiveness, possibly driven by lower perceived
attractiveness of print advertising relative to outside media options. In addition, the influence of
the effect of readership on the demand for inserts (i.e., effect of the capacity constraint imposed by
the size of the readership) is not significant when we use search propensity instruments. Therefore,
35The smaller role played by price increases in specification (b) can possibly be explained by the lower price elasticity
estimate resulting from this specification.
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we set ∂q2∂R = 0 for inserts in Equation 9 when we compute optimal prices for that case. An
implication of the insignificant relationship is that changes in demand for inserts will not play a
role in readership pricing. However, the effect of readership is significant at the 10% level in the ad
demand model when we use National newspaper readership as an instrument (model specification
’a’ in Table 11). We find that our main findings are robust to treating this effect as significant and
employing the estimated value of ∂q2∂R while computing optimal markups.
Overall, these results suggest that the decline in the intrinsic preference on the advertiser side
was probably steeper than the corresponding changes on the reader side. Therefore, prima facie,
it appears that the former played a greater role in driving up the subscription prices. However, we
cannot conclusively make such an assessment without considering how the shifts in readership and
advertising demand curves affect optimal prices.
6.3 Optimal Prices
In order to assess whether the optimal prices implied by our model and the readership and adver-
tising demand estimates, we use data from 2006-2010 (i.e., 60 months) as a calibration sample.36
We use the remaining 12 months of data on subscription prices for out of sample validation. Our
calibration involves computing the optimal markups on both sides of the market as described in
Equation (9), conditional on the estimated readership and advertising demand parameters. We
then use these estimates to generate predicted prices for 2011 and compare them with the observed
2011 prices.
We present these actual and predicted prices for the entire duration in Figure 6 for the core
market. Those for the region outside the core market are similar. The prices that were predicted
by the model for year 2011 are similar to the corresponding observed prices. The Mean Absolute
Percent Deviation (MAPD) between observed and predicted prices for 2011 range between 12%-
17% for the three subscription options (which are in the ballpark of MAPDs between actual and
predicted prices reported by Nair, 2007 and Liu, 2010).37
The results from this model suggest that the marginal costs declined during the period of our
analysis (Figure 7). Therefore, the increase in subscription prices were driven primarily by the
36We adopt a linear time trend to account for temporal trends in marginal costs. The predictors in the calibration
regression account for 95.9% of the observed variation in marginal costs.
37Our in-sample MAPD ranges between 17.4%-17.8%. The out of sample MAPD range between 12.1%-16.8%.
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endogenous decision by the newspaper to increase its price-cost margins on the reader side.
6.3.1 What explains the increase in subscription prices?
Recall that we had advanced the decline in WTP for the newspaper in the presence of heterogeneous
preferences and lower incentive to subsidize readers at the expense of advertisers as two reasons
why it might be optimal for the newspaper to increase its subscription prices. Similar to to Liu
(2010), we perform counterfactual analyses to understand the extent to which the two mechanisms
are responsible for the increase in subscription prices.
We first consider the role of the decline in readers’ WTP. In order to assess the extent to which
the decline in readers’ WTP contributed to changes in the firm’s pricing, we first compute the
predicted level of readership when there is no decline in readers’ preferences. To this end, we
simulate the readership that would have accrued based on the estimated readership model when
all the year dummies for years 2007-2011 are set to zero (i.e., maintaining readers’ preferences for
the newspaper at the same levels as in 2006). We then use this readership demand to calculate the
corresponding advertising demand using Equation (5). Next, in order to assess the extent to which
the decline in the intrinsic attractiveness of advertising led to increases in subscription prices, we use
the advertising demand parameters to arrive at a predicted level of advertising demand generated
by maintaining perceived advertising attractiveness at the 2006 level. As in the readership case,
we switch off the estimated year fixed effects for 2007-2011 at their original levels (as they were in
year 2006). Recall that these year fixed effects capture the extent to which the advertising demand
curve shifts downward from year to year. Using the predicted advertising demand, we computed the
counterfactual markups without the witnessed decline in the intrinsic attractiveness of advertising.
To quantify the contribution of our two proposed explanations, we compare how optimal
markups evolved between 2006 and 2011 in each of the three cases: actual markups (computed
based on our model parameters), the case where we switch off the decline in readers’ preferences,
and the case where we switch off the decline in the incentive to subsidize readers at the expense of
advertisers. Consider the first explanation corresponding to the decline in readers’ preferences. In
order to compute its contribution, we compare the percentage deviations between 2006 and 2011
in the markups predicted by the model when we switch off the decline in readers’ preferences, with
the corresponding change in actual markups based on our model parameters. We use a similar
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procedure for the second explanation. We then compute the relative contribution of each of the
explanations based on these percentage deviations.38
We present the results from this analysis in Table 12. These results suggest that within the
core market, the decline in readers’ preferences accounted for between 8-21% of the increase in
subscription prices. On the other hand, nearly 79-92% of the increase in subscription prices between
2006 and 2011 can be traced back to the decreasing incentive on the part of the newspaper to
subsidize readers at the expense of advertisers. The results for the counties outside the core market
exhibit a similar pattern; decline in readers’ preferences can only explain around 15% of the increase
in subscription prices. Overall, these results suggest a conscious shift on the part of the newspaper
from being heavily dependent on advertising to a more balanced model where readers make a
sizeable contribution too. In order to internalize the actual impact of the decline in advertising,
we present the relative average susbcription and advertising revenue per reader, in our data, in
Table 6. While advertising constituted 87% of the revenue contribution per reader in 2006, its
share decreased to 69% in 2011, suggesting a shift towards a more balanced revenue model. This
important pattern motivated our study of the role played by advertising subsidy in determining
price increases to readers.
We further explore the decreasing role of advertising subsidy and the extent to which the
resulting increase in subscription prices can be traced back to different types of print advertising. We
report the relative extent to which different types of advertising contributed to the price increase in
Table 12. These results suggest that the decline in display and classifieds advertising primarily drove
the subscription price increases. Thus, our results add to the limited literature that has attempted
to document the influence of the classifieds advertising trough on the changes to newspapers’
marketing mix (Seamans and Zhu, 2014). Note that while Seamans and Zhu (2014) document a
much smaller impact of classifieds advertising decline on subscription prices (3.3%), the end date
of their analysis (i.e., 2007) corresponds to the period when newspapers had just started increasing
subscription prices. Overall, these results suggest that the increase in subscription prices represent
a structural shift from a model where the newspaper used advertising revenue to subsidize readers,
to a more balanced revenue model.
38We perform our computations based on markups because of our earlier finding that they were the primary driver
behind the increase in subscription prices. Our results remain unchanged if we computed them based on actual and
predicted prices. We present these counterfactual predicted prices in Figure 8.
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The steeper price increase for the Daily subscription option suggests that the newspaper is keen
to retain the low valuation readers during weekends, but not on weekdays. The rationale is that as a
result of shrinking advertising, the gap between the Daily and Sunday-only subscription options, in
terms of the revenue generated per reader, has reduced over time; while the Daily option generated
$67.57 ($0.81) more in advertising (circulation) revenue per reader than the Sunday-only option in
2006, the gap shrank (increased) to $37.94 ($2.81) in 2010.39 Thus, while the average Daily option
reader contributed $41.79 in 2006, that number dropped to $38.54 in 2010.
In sum, results from our model suggest that the decline in advertising subsidy was an instru-
mental driver of the steep subscription price increases faced by newspaper readers over the last
five years. As a result, the newspaper is moving to a more balanced revenue model where readers
and advertising contribute equally in generating revenues. Further, the newspaper is using price
as a lever to motivate low WTP readers of the Daily option to migrate to more profitable weekend
subscription options. An extreme version of this strategy is where newspapers restrict circulation
of the print newspaper only to weekends, a strategy adopted by many U.S. newspapers (Lendon,
2008; Carmichael, 2010).
6.4 Robustness Checks
6.4.1 The Effect of Online Ad Revenue
The above analyses assume that the readers that quit the print newspaper as a result of increasing
subscription prices do not generate any revenue. However, it is conceivable that some of the readers
that quit the print version migrate online. Although the newspaper in question did not charge online
visitors for news consumption, these marginal readers could still generate advertising revenue. If
this extra online ad revenue is substantial and the newspaper internalized this while increasing its
subscription prices, our explanation for these price increases is likely to be contaminated.
Nevertheless, incorporating the additional ad revenue formally would require us to (a) charac-
terize the switching pattern between online and print news, albeit within the same newspaper and
(b) parse out the extent to which the subscribers quitting the print newspaper and moving online
are incremental online readers. Since we do not have individual data on joint online and print
39These ad revenue per reader numbers are based on our data that span 2006-2010 for Weekday and Sunday
advertising.
38
6.4 Robustness Checks 6 RESULTS
readership, the case for the inference of these two effects is likely to be tenuous. In order to cir-
cumvent this problem, we make the following generous assumptions on the extra online ad revenue
generated as a result of print subscription price increases: a) all the print subscribers that quit the
print newspaper move to the newspaper’s online edition and b) these readers are all incremental
readers of the online newspaper. In reality, given that there in typically some overlap in print and
online readership, not every incoming online reader would be incremental.40 We obtained monthly
online ad expenditures for the newspaper from the firm and backed out the advertising revenue
generated by each unique visitor to the newspaper’s website. Then we use price elasticities based
on our model to compute the switching rate corresponding to a unit price increase to the daily
newspaper.
Based on these assumptions, we compute the projected online revenue for this new higher level
of online readership. We find an incremental online revenue of 3.42% in 2006, which drops down
to 2.02% for 2011, given the switching patterns. This represents an insignificant 0.07% (0.51%)
increase over print advertising (circulation) revenues. As a final reality check, we compute optimal
markups for the three subscription alternatives if the firm considered online revenues as an addi-
tional revenue source while setting print subscription prices. We then compare these markups, as
earlier, to quantify the contribution of each of the three explanations.41 We present this compar-
ison in column (1) in Table 13. The relative contribution of the motive to gain online advertising
revenues is small, at around 5.7%, when compared with that of the decline in advertising. Fur-
thermore, consistent with our earlier finding, changes in the advertising side of the market played
a more prominent role in driving up the subscription prices.
6.4.2 Considering Differential Responsiveness of Advertising to Weekday and Sunday
Readership
In our empirical specification, we computed the total readership metric based on the assumption
that 75% of the ad revenue came from the Sunday newspaper. However, the percentage of ad
revenue that the newspaper derives from the Sunday newspaper is a consequence of endogenous
40Interviews with managers at the newspaper revealed that between 20-25% of print readers also visited the online
edition over our analysis horizon.
41We present the comparison of markups for the case with readership reweighting, with Sunday accounting for 75%
of ad revenues.
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decisions made by advertisers in response to the changing composition of readership during different
days of the week. In order to capture this phenomenon, we need to allow advertising demand to
respond differently to weekday and Sunday CPMs, and consequently to the corresponding reader-
ship volumes. Given that our advertising data were not broken down by the days of the week, the
cleanest approach to addressing the differential extent to which circulation on various days of the
week generate ad revenues would be infer how advertising changes in response to variation in read-
ership on different days of the week over time. The premise is that the cross-sectional and temporal
variation in subscriptions during different days of the week will help us infer how advertisers value
readers within a week. However, empirically, we were unable to uncover significant differences in
advertiser sensitivity to readership on different days of the week.
It is somewhat common in the newspaper industry to price Sunday advertising at a premium
over non-Sunday ads (ranging from an average of 26%, 33% and 51% respectively for display, inserts
and classifieds in our data).42 While we do not have advertising data broken down by weekdays
vs. Sundays for the entire period of our analysis, such data were available for a part of our time
frame (i.e., 54 months from Jan 2006-Jun 2010). The variation in these data enables us to estimate
a richer advertising demand model that allows for different responsiveness of weekday and Sunday
advertising to the corresponding changes in weekday and Sunday CPMs. We then use the estimates
of this demand model (presented in Table A.4 in Appendix 4) to compute the contribution of our
proposed explanations.43 We see that our results are substantively unchanged (Table 13 column
(2)), with the decline in the incentive to subsidize advertisers accounting for a large share of the
increase in subscription prices.
6.4.3 Accounting for Single Copy Sales
In reality, the total circulation of the newspaper would comprise of both subscription and single
copy sales. As discussed earlier, while we have subscription data at the county level, single copy
(newsstand) sales data are available only at the overall market level. In order to investigate the
robustness of our results to the inclusion of single copy sales, we used the single copy sales data at
42This forms the basis of our categorization of advertising into Sundays and non-Sundays (termed “weekdays” for
simplicity).
43When we tested for the effect of the capacity constraint on the demand for inserts in this model, we find the effect
to be non-significant (Table A.4). We therefore set ∂q2/∂R for weekday/Sunday advertising to zero in this robustness
analysis.
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the market level to construct a fourth inside option. The assumption here is that the single copy
sales at different counties are proportional to their respective subscription levels.
We present the results from this alternative readership model in Table 14. We then reestimated
the readership and advertising demand models using these data on single copy sales. With these new
estimates we recomputed the relative magnitudes of the two explanations. As in earlier analyses, we
find that the optimal subscription (advertising) prices increase (decrease) during the period of our
analysis. We present the results on the relative extent to which decline in readers’ preferences and
advertising subsidy played a role in driving up subscription prices in column (3) of Table 13. We
see that the decline in readers’ preferences and in advertising subsidy explain 12.48% and 87.52%
of the price increases respectively, suggesting that our results are robust to the inclusion/exclusion
of single-copy sales as a choice option for the reader.44
7 Discussion and Conclusion
In spite of facing declining demand, newspaper publishers have increased print subscription prices
for readers. The overall revenue implications for the publisher from raising prices for readers may
be especially nuanced in this industry as nearly three-fourths of its revenues derive from advertising,
which depends critically on the presence of readers. So why have subscription prices substantially
increased? We propose and estimate a model to answer this question, allowing for the influence
of externalities created by the firm’s subscription price-setting process on its advertising revenues.
We model both reader and the advertiser demand for the print newspaper, and tie them to a model
of the newspaper’s pricing decision.
Our results suggest that decline in advertising subsidy was a big reason for why readers are
increasingly facing higher subscription prices today. Thus, we supplement extant literature that
mainly attributes price increases to heterogeneity in WTP by documenting that the platform’s need
to balance revenues from both sides of the market can play a dominant role in driving such changes.
This basic premise has several conceptual parallels with pricing practice in other industries. For
example, Bank of America proposed (but later revoked) surcharges to consumers for debit card
44While these results are based on aggregate (sub-market level) data, they are comparable with our results using
micro-moments as our micro-moments are used only to identify heterogeneity, while the means are recovered using
aggregate data.
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usage in order to offset anticipated losses from a new rule that capped the fees that banks could
charge merchants.45 Thus, an exogenous change in demand on one side can prompt sizable changes
to pricing on the other. Another example is Netflix’s recent price hike to subscribing customers
(Welch, 2016), which was believed to be motivated in part by an inevitable reduction in content
variety (Lovely, 2016).
Our data are also consistent with the subsidiary explanation that the newspaper adopted a
price-based segmentation strategy focused on charging higher prices in order to serve only the loyal
readers of its most popular option, possibly in an attempt at coping with the large revenue decline
it has witnessed over the last five years. This indicates that newspapers may be becoming a more
niche product serving a smaller readership base. Further, this result is also suggestive of a change in
the mainstream information dissemination role played by newspapers in the society (Weibull, 1992).
However, a shift in newspapers’ traditionally advertising-supported revenue structures towards a
more “balanced” subscription-cum-advertiser-funded model appears to be appropriate, especially
given the nature of decline in newspaper advertising.
An appealing feature of our study is that the readership and advertising data used in the
estimation are similar to data that are typically available to newspaper firms. This makes the
model managerially useful as newspaper firms can apply our model to readily available data to
inform their pricing portfolio decisions, such as whether to add or remove advertising products,
etc. However, our study also has some limitations, several of which can be attributed to the
nature of data we have available. On the advertising side, our ability to capture richer interactions
between demand for the three advertising options, or to specify a demand model aimed at modeling
individual advertisers’ choice rules is restricted by the aggregate nature of advertising data we have
available. Our proposed modeling framework focuses mainly on accounting for newspapers’ distinct
advertising revenue sources and their role in the firm’s subscription pricing process.
A limitation of our model is its inability to account for possible dynamics in the newspaper
advertising market. Future work focused on enriching the demand models to incorporate the dif-
ferential influence of Sunday and Weekday newspaper readership, in a more rigorous fashion, could
generate interesting pricing implications for the firm. Other examples of this include - a) estimat-
45https://consumerist.com/2014/03/07/bank-of-americas-new-debit-card-charges-5month-for-something-that-is-
free-on-all-accounts/
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ing the optimal advertising markups at the advertiser segment (Local vs. National advertisers)
level, to inform potential targeted pricing rules for the publisher, and b) specifying a richer struc-
ture to capture the heterogeneity in different advertisers’ willingness-to-pay for access to higher
willingness-to-pay readers. Another limitation of our model is that it is unable to account for
potential dynamics introduced by the presence of state dependence in the market for newspaper
readership. Such implications may be valuable to marketing managers as they design strategies to
salvage dwindling readership and advertising revenues.
Previous work studying the newspaper industry (Fan, 2013) has discussed the role of changes in
market structure (e.g., newspaper consolidations/mergers) in influencing newspaper prices. Thus,
newspaper consolidations may indeed have contributed to some of the price increases in the print
newspaper industry especially over a longer-horizon.46 Our ability to account for such explanations
is constrained by the nature of our data, i.e. the newspaper that shared the data used in this
analysis is not part of a large multi-newspaper or mass-media group franchise. Thus, though prices
in the focal newspaper’s market are unlikely to be influenced by similar changes in market structure
over the time frame of our analysis, it is possible that prices at other large newspapers may be. In
sum, we hope our empirical study has shed academic and managerial light on price setting practices
in newspaper/media markets, and more generally in two-sided markets.
46Fan (2013) documents that over 75% of newspaper consolidations in her data (which range from 1998-2005)
occurred in the period 1998-2002.
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Appendix 1
Readership re-weighting to account for differential advertising contribution of the
Weekday/Sunday newspapers
We consider the case where the Sunday version of the newspaper contributes 75% of the news-
paper’s total advertising revenues (the industry benchmark). Let $ and s¨ denote the per-reader
advertising contribution of the Weekday (including Saturday) and Sunday newspaper respectively.
If the Sunday edition is responsible for 75% of total advertising revenues, we have
(RDaily +RWknd +RSun)s¨
RDaily(6$ + s¨) +RWknd(2$ + s¨) +RSuns¨
= 34
This can be used to compute an expression for $/s¨, which can further be used to reweight readership
according to the expression: Rt = RDaily ∗ [6 ($/s¨) + 1] + RWknd ∗ [2($/s¨) + 1] + RSun in the
advertising demand model to account for the differential advertising contribution of the Sunday
newspaper.
Appendix 2
Does newspaper advertising influence subscription decisions?
To try to answer this question with our data, we estimated the readership model allowing
the levels of advertising (proxied by total advertising quantity) to influence consumer utility. We
found that its effect is negative, small and statistically insignificant (last column in Table A.1).
However, readers’ subscription decisions may be influenced differentially by the three advertising
types: Display ads, Inserts, and Classifieds. To explore this possibility we estimated alternative
model specifications where we allowed the three advertising types to influence readers’ decisions
individually.47 We found that the coefficients on the advertising terms were insignificant in all
cases. We found no difference in the result based on whether or not we allowed the advertising
effect to vary by option (Table A.2), or allowed these coefficients to be heterogeneous.48 Further,
as we described in the Estimation section, in our empirical specification for readership demand,
we specify year-fixed effects to flexibly capture the temporal evolution of readers’ preferences.
Therefore, the insignificant effect of advertising on readership just suggests that the within year
variation in advertising might not have an effect on readership. A concern is that these year fixed
effects may also be capturing the significant influence of year-on-year changes in advertising on
subscription decisions. To assess the validity of this concern, we also estimated alternative model
specifications for readership demand with advertising included as a covariate, but without year
fixed effects. We found that the advertising coefficients were statistically insignificant even after
excluding the year fixed effects. We provide these results in Table A.2. This helps us place more
faith in our assumption that newspaper subscription decisions are not influenced by advertising
levels.
47Given the high temporal correlation (0.55-0.85) between the three types of advertising, we could not estimate a
model that allowed for the simultaneous influence of all three advertising quantities.
48These results can be obtained from the authors on request.
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Does advertising influence readers’ subscription decisions?
Parameter Display Inserts Classifieds Total Ad-
vertising
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Pref (M-Thurs) 2.30*** 0.26 2.28** 0.25 2.29** 0.26 2.29** 0.26
Pref (Fri,Sat) -1.77*** 0.12 -1.77** 0.11 -1.77** 0.12 -1.77** 0.12
Pref (Sun) -6.67*** 0.50 -6.68** 0.50 -6.76** 0.56 -6.67** 0.50
core market price -0.05* 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 -0.05* 0.02
outside core
market price
-0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01
# of news pgs 0.44** 0.16 0.45** 0.15 0.45** 0.15 0.45** 0.15
C1-Income 0.64** 0.07 0.64** 0.07 0.64** 0.07 8.98** 0.07
C2-Income 0.46** 0.08 0.46** 0.08 0.46** 0.08 5.58** 0.08
C3-Income 0.29** 0.09 0.29** 0.09 0.29** 0.09 3.36** 0.09
C4-Income 0.58** 0.08 0.58** 0.08 0.58** 0.08 7.73** 0.08
C5-Income 0.13+ 0.08 0.13+ 0.08 0.13+ 0.08 1.61** 0.08
core market
Y2007
-0.30** 0.06 -0.30** 0.06 -0.29** 0.06 -0.30** 0.06
core market
Y2008
-0.48** 0.08 -0.48** 0.07 -0.45** 0.11 -0.48** 0.07
core market
Y2009
-0.16+ 0.09 -0.16* 0.07 -0.12 0.12 -0.17* 0.08
core market
Y2010
-0.16 0.10 -0.16* 0.08 -0.11 0.12 -0.17+ 0.09
core market
Y2011
-0.29* 0.11 -0.29** 0.08 -0.23+ 0.14 -0.29** 0.10
Outside core
market Y2007
-0.17** 0.05 -0.17** 0.05 -0.17** 0.05 -0.17** 0.05
Outside core
market Y2008
-0.30** 0.07 -0.30** 0.06 -0.27** 0.10 -0.30** 0.07
Outside core
market Y2009
-0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.07
Outside core
market Y2010
0.04 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.08
Outside core
market Y2011
0.03 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.03 0.09
Display
Advertising
-0.03 0.14
Inserts -0.05 0.10
Classifieds
Advertising
0.64 2.02
Total Advertising -0.21 0.59
** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table A.1: Appendix - Alternative specifications for the readership model (1)
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Allowing for
different
effects of
advertising
for Daily,
Weekend
and Sunday
options
Effect of advertising excluding year dummies and
demographic controls
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Pref (M-Thurs) 0.63 1.29 0.62 1.03 0.54 1.03 0.64 1.01 0.59 1.03
Pref (Fri,Sat) -2.72** 0.64 -2.52** 0.47 -2.56** 0.47 -2.50** 0.46 -2.54** 0.47
Pref (Sun) -6.01** 1.22 -5.77** 0.90 -5.72** 0.90 -5.95** 0.94 -5.74** 0.90
core market price 0.18* 0.06 0.16** 0.05 0.16** 0.05 0.17** 0.06 0.16** 0.05
Outside core market
price
0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05
# of news pgs 1.50 0.98 1.42* 0.64 1.48** 0.64 1.37* 0.62 1.45** 0.64
Display Advertising -0.10 0.32
Inserts -0.27 0.37
Classifieds
Advertising
1.16 2.71
Total Advertising -0.81 1.72
Total
Advertising-Daily
-0.82 7.75
Total Advertising-
Weekend
2.51 3.87
Total
Advertising-Sunday
-0.06 3.19
** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table A.2: Appendix - Alternative specifications for the readership model (2)
Appendix 3
Simulation
To whether the actual variation in our data is sufficient to recover the parameters of interest, we
perform a simulation exercise. In line with Liu et al. (2010), we first generate demand shocks by
regressing log sales on our instruments. Using these demand shocks, we use the data generating
process to simulate the dependent variable (market shares). In order to keep the simulation exercise
straightforward, we consider a simple random normal heterogeneity distribution only on the inter-
cept, and first simulate the individual choices. We aggregated these data to mimic the sub-market
level data that we use in our estimation. Next we estimate the demand parameters using these
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simulated data, employing the same instruments used to generate the demand shocks earlier, with
the objective of recovering the mean utility parameters. We repeat the above process 100 times,
using the same draws to synthesize all 100 datasets. We report the means and standard deviations
across these 100 trials, and the Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) of our recovered estimates from
these 100 datasets for each model in Table A.3. Our recovered parameters are similar to the initial
values used in the simulation in all cases. We consider four cases: (a) model estimated using data
on one option (only the Daily option), (b) model estimated overall market-level data on all three
subscription options, (c) model estimated on sub-market (county) level data and three subscrip-
tion options, and (d) model as in (c) where we allow for correlations between the option specific
intercepts.49
A substantive finding here is that recoverability improves with the availability/use of greater
number of markets and options. For example, a model estimated on county level data with three
inside options has lower MAD than one that uses market data and a single choice option. The
results suggest that we are able to recover the key mean utility parameters, i.e., year fixed effects
as well as sensitivity to price and the number of news pages, reasonably well, in addition to the
parameters governing the heterogeneity distribution over the subscription options. These results
give us some confidence that we can recover both the mean utility parameters as well as the
heterogeneity distribution using the variation in our data.
49We present the parameters corresponding to the lower-triangular matrix that captures the correlation between
the option specific intercepts in the table.
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7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Appendix 4
Considering Differential Responsiveness of Advertising to Weekday and Sunday Read-
ership
In this section, we present the detailed estimates of the demand for advertising, estimated on data
broken down by weekdays and Sundays. The estimates verify the robustness of our results from
the baseline advertising demand model (the elasticities as well as the temporal trends in advertiser
intrinsic attractiveness are similar across the two specifications).
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Parameter Est SE
Ad type specific intercepts for Wkday √
Ad type specific intercepts for Sunday √
CPM_Wkday -0.96** 0.14
Effect of Readership for
Inserts_Wkday
1.24 1.27
Y2007_Wkday_display -0.07 0.11
Y2008_Wkday_display -0.37** 0.10
Y2009_Wkday_display -0.46** 0.16
Y2010_Wkday_display -0.41** 0.15
Y2007_Wkday_inserts -0.18 0.11
Y2008_Wkday_inserts -0.08 0.10
Y2009_Wkday_inserts -0.01 0.42
Y2010_Wkday_inserts 0.14 0.65
Y2007_Wkday_classifieds -0.19** 0.02
Y2008_Wkday_classifieds -0.68** 0.04
Y2009_Wkday_classifieds -1.22** 0.09
Y2010_Wkday_classifieds -1.31** 0.11
Quarter fixed effects for each type for
Wkday advertising
√
CPM_Sun -1.03** 0.25
Effect of Readership for Inserts_Sun 0.39 0.73
Y2007_Sun_display -0.11* 0.05
Y2008_Sun_display -0.27** 0.04
Y2009_Sun_display -0.54** 0.06
Y2010_Sun_display -0.56** 0.07
Y2007_Sun_inserts -0.10* 0.04
Y2008_Sun_inserts -0.13 0.12
Y2009_Sun_inserts -0.31 0.29
Y2010_Sun_inserts -0.42 0.45
Y2007_Sun_classifieds -0.18** 0.05
Y2008_Sun_classifieds -0.59** 0.06
Y2009_Sun_classifieds -1.88** 0.17
Y2010_Sun_classifieds -2.11** 0.20
Quarter fixed effects for each ad type
for Sun advtg.
√
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table A.4: Advertising model estimated on Weekday/Sunday advertising data
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Tables and Figures
(A) Readership
Avg. subscription share
(aggregate data)
Avg. subs. price (inflation
adjusted)
(% of households subscribing to the newspaper) ($/month)
option Within the Core
market
Outside the Core
market
Within the Core
market
Outside the Core
market
Daily 13.24% 2.62% 16.28 18.28
Weekend 0.98% 0.16% 11.76 12.48
Sun only 3.97% 0.86% 10.12 10.88
(B) Advertising Revenues
Year 2006 Year 2011 Change
Advertising Type (in Mill. $) (in Mill. $) (%, with year 2006 as base)
Display 9.10 3.85 -57.7%
Inserts 3.95 2.26 -43.38%
Classifieds 4.04 0.47 -88.27%
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
% increase in inflation-adjusted prices between 2006-2011
option Within Core market Outside Core market
Daily 77.22% 77.45%
Weekend 52.73% 52.52%
Sun only 37.74% 43.70%
Table 2: Subscription price increases for each option
option Based on aggregate data Based on individual data
Within the Core market Outside the Core market Within the Core market Outside the Core market
Daily 72.79% 71.98% 70.14% 69.08%
Weekend 5.39% 4.40% 4.87% 4.38%
Sun only 21.83% 23.63% 25.00% 26.55%
Table 3: Average market share of each option, conditional on subscribing to the newspaper
Aggregate data Individual data
Daily Weekend Sun only Daily Weekend Sun only
Core market -8.36% -4.75% -2.27% -8.44% -4.39% -2.78%
Outside core market -6.21% -5.09% 4.46% -7.14% -5.50% 5.24%
Table 4: Avg. year-on-year % decay rate in circulation shares (between 2006-2011) within/outside
the Core market
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Year Display Inserts Classifieds
2006 0.44 59.60 1.83
2007 0.42 57.27 1.75
2008 0.48 56.85 1.82
2009 0.50 54.88 0.98
2010 0.53 58.20 0.94
2011 0.57 59.30 0.97
Table 5: CPM for each Advertising Option
CPM for display and classifieds is computed by dividing the corresponding ad rate (in $ per col.
inches) by the number of readers (in thousands); those for inserts are in cost per thousand inserts.
Revenue contribution per reader Year 2006 Year 2011
(%) (%)
Subscription 12.62 31.19
Advertising 87.38 68.81
Table 6: Relative contribution of reader and advertiser side of the newspaper market
Year % contribution of
Sunday advtg.
2006 74
2007 74
2008 75
2009 70
2010 (first 6 months) 70
Table 7: Sunday advertising contribution
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(A) Readership Model
Endogenous variable→ Subscription Prices # News pages
Parameter Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
PPI Paper Mills 1.05** 0.14 −0.71+ 0.38
PPI Book Publishers -2.79 2.92 0.48 0.74
PPI Printing Ink Mfg. 2.49 1.94 -0.61 0.49
Dummies for each option √ √ √ √
County demographics, Year fixed effects √ √ √ √
R2 0.48 0.84 0.91 0.94
(B) Advertising Model
Readership of National Newspapers Instrument Search Propensity Instruments
Endogenous variable→ Advertising Rates Readership Advertising Rates Readership
Parameter Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
PPI Advertising Agencies -0.76 0.76 5.19** 1.89 0.31 0.08 0.74** 0.26
PPI Lithographic/Offset
Printing Ink
1.38** 0.59 -0.15 0.15 0.39** 0.07 1.22** 0.18
% Readership of other
newspapers
0.98** 0.35 7.24** 0.36
Search propensity -
“news”
0.19** 0.06 0.05 0.22
Search propensity -
“<name of city> news”
0.01 0.05 0.81** 0.20
Advertising type dummies √ √ √ √
Year fixed effects √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
R2 0.64 0.76 0.73 0.84 0.64 0.78 0.73 0.88
** p<0.01, *p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 8: First stage regressions of endogenous variables on instruments
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Parameter Est. SE
Option specific intercepts
√
Core market price -0.07** 0.01
Outside core market price -0.05** 0.01
# of news pgs 0.18** 0.06
Core market Y2007 -0.01 0.04
Core market Y2008 -0.10* 0.05
Core market Y2009 0.06+ 0.04
Core market Y2010 -0.01 0.03
Core market Y2011 −0.06+ 0.04
Outside core market Y2007 -0.14** 0.02
Outside core market Y2008 -0.29** 0.04
Outside core market Y2009 0.04 0.03
Outside core market Y2010 0.11** 0.03
Outside core market Y2011 0.12** 0.04
County fixed effects, Cty Income
√
Est (Ltt) SE
1.32** 0.01
0.18** 0.01
0.17** 0.02
0.30** 0.00
0.28** 0.00
0.30** 0.02
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 9: Readership demand – with news pages and a common temporal trend across options
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Parameter Est. SE
Option specific intercepts
√
price -0.03** 0.00
Core market Y2007 - b1 -0.10** 0.02
Core market Y2008 - b1 -0.23** 0.02
Core market Y2009 - b1 -0.28** 0.02
Core market Y2010 - b1 -0.35** 0.02
Core market Y2011 - b1 -0.51** 0.02
Outside core market Y2007 - b1 -0.05** 0.01
Outside core market Y2008 - b1 -0.16** 0.02
Outside core market Y2009 - b1 -0.07** 0.01
Outside core market Y2010 - b1 -0.02 0.02
Outside core market Y2011 - b1 -0.09** 0.02
Core market Y2007 - b2 0.06** 0.02
Core market Y2008 - b2 -0.05* 0.02
Core market Y2009 - b2 -0.08** 0.02
Core market Y2010 - b2 -0.21** 0.02
Core market Y2011 - b2 -0.23** 0.02
Outside core market Y2007 - b2 -0.11** 0.01
Outside core market Y2008 - b2 -0.28** 0.01
Outside core market Y2009 - b2 -0.10** 0.01
Outside core market Y2010 - b2 -0.19** 0.01
Outside core market Y2011 - b2 -0.24** 0.01
Core market Y2007 - b3 0.00 0.03
Core market Y2008 - b3 -0.16** 0.02
Core market Y2009 - b3 0.00 0.03
Core market Y2010 - b3 -0.07** 0.02
Core market Y2011 - b3 -0.11** 0.02
Outside core market Y2007 - b3 -0.20** 0.02
Outside core market Y2008 - b3 -0.46** 0.03
Outside core market Y2009 - b3 -0.05* 0.02
Outside core market Y2010 - b3 0.15** 0.02
Outside core market Y2011 - b3 0.28** 0.03
County fixed effects, Cty Income
√
Est (Ltt) SE
0.07** 0.01
0.04** 0.01
0.04** 0.01
0.10** 0.01
0.09** 0.01
0.09** 0.01
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 10: Readership demand - without news pages, with option specific year fixed effects and a
common price coefficient
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Parameter Model a - National
newspaper
readership
instrument
Model b - Search
propensity
instruments
Est. SE Est. SE
Ad type specific
intercepts
√ √
CPM -1.30** 0.55 −2.55+ 1.38
Effect of readership
for Inserts
3.89+ 2.35 3.97 3.31
Y2007_display -0.13** 0.04 -0.22* 0.10
Y2008_display -0.27** 0.03 -0.23** 0.05
Y2009_display -0.53** 0.05 -0.44** 0.11
Y2010_display -0.48** 0.08 -0.30 0.20
Y2011_display -0.55** 0.11 -0.32 0.26
Y2007_inserts -0.20* 0.09 −0.26+ 0.15
Y2008_inserts 0.01 0.14 -0.10 0.26
Y2009_inserts 0.11 0.38 -0.02 0.59
Y2010_inserts 0.53 0.69 0.46 0.99
Y2011_inserts 0.71 0.87 0.63 1.24
Y2007_classifieds -0.23** 0.06 -0.34** 0.14
Y2008_classifieds -0.69** 0.08 -0.82** 0.14
Y2009_classifieds -1.84** 0.39 -2.70** 0.98
Y2010_classifieds -1.93** 0.40 -2.83** 1.01
Y2011_classifieds -2.10** 0.39 -2.98** 0.99
Quarter fixed effects
for each ad type
√ √
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 11: Advertising model results
National Newspaper Readership Instrument Search Propensity Instruments
Reader model:
With news pages,
common yr fixed
ef
Reader model:
Common price
coef and
option-year fixed
ef
Reader model:
With news pages,
common yr fixed
ef
Reader model:
Common price
coef and
option-year fixed
ef
Decline in readers’
preferences
10.13% 20.70% 8.18% 18.01%
Decline in
advertising
89.87% 79.30% 91.82% 81.99%
of which:
display contributes 47.63% 41.59% 49.72% 44.92%
inserts contributes 3.36% 3.40% 0 % 0 %
classifieds
contributes
38.88% 34.31% 42.10% 37.07%
Table 12: Pricing results
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Explanation Considering the best
case scenario where all
exiting print readers
migrate to the online
newspaper
Using the advertising
model estimated on
Weekday/Sunday
advertising data
Readership Model
with single copy as the
fourth inside option
(1) (2) (3)
Decline in Readers’
Preferences
3.01% 44.35% 12.48%
Decline in
Advertising
Subsidy
91.31% 55.65% 87.52%
Gain in Online
Advertising
Revenues
5.70% N/A N/A
Table 13: Robustness Checks
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Parameter Est. SE
SD - Daily Subs 1.07** 0.16
SD - Weekend Subs 0.52 2.72
SD - Sun Subs 1.20** 0.32
SD - Single Copy 0.97 1.30
Daily Subs -5.48** 0.60
Weekend Subs -7.70** 1.65
Sun Subs -6.56** 0.67
Single Copy -6.02** 1.27
Core market - Subs price -0.06** 0.01
Core market - Single Copy price -0.21* 0.08
Outside core market - Subs price -0.03** 0.01
Outside core market - Single Copy price 0.21** 0.08
News pages 0.29** 0.07
Core market Y2007 -0.30** 0.05
Core market Y2008 -0.49** 0.06
Core market Y2009 -0.19** 0.04
Core market Y2010 -0.17** 0.04
Core market Y2011 -0.32** 0.05
Outside core market Y2007 -0.12* 0.05
Outside core market Y2008 -0.22** 0.06
Outside core market Y2009 0.03 0.06
Outside core market Y2010 0.02 0.07
Outside core market Y2011 -0.02 0.06
Cty Income
√
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Table 14: Readership Model using aggregate sub-market level data, with single copy as the fourth
inside option
61
REFERENCES REFERENCES
Cor=0.998
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
Fo
ca
l N
ew
sp
ap
er
's
 
Ad
 
R
ev
 
(B
)
20
30
40
50
Al
l U
.
S.
 
Ne
w
sp
ap
er
s'
 
Ad
 
Re
v 
(B
)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
U.S. print newspapers Focal Newspaper
Focal newspaper and all U.S. print newspapers
Advertising Revenue Comparison
Cor=0.967
.
16
.
2
.
24
Fo
ca
l N
ew
sp
ap
er
's
 
Ci
rc
 
(M
M
)
44
49
54
Al
l U
.
S.
 
Ne
w
sp
ap
er
s'
 
Ci
rc
 
(M
M
)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
U.S. print newspapers Focal newspaper
Focal newspaper's circulation and that of all U.S. print newspapers
Circulation Comparison
Figure 1: Comparison of Readership and Advertising Revenue trends of the Focal newspaper with
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Figure 2: County circulation shares
Month 1 corresponds to Jan 2006 and 72 to Dec 2011.
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Month 1 corresponds to Jan 2006 and 72 to Dec 2011.
-7.58
-5.87
-7.37
-10.72
-3.06
-
10
-
8
-
6
-
4
-
2
0
D
ec
ay
 
ra
te
 
(%
)
NDM1 ONDM1 ONDM2 NDM2 ONDM3
Daily
-4.28
-3.07
-7.38
-6.15
-.24
-
8
-
6
-
4
-
2
0
D
ec
ay
 
ra
te
 
(%
)
NDM1 ONDM1 ONDM2 NDM2 ONDM3
Fri Sat Sun
-2
4.69
3.11
-3.07
8.26
-
5
0
5
10
D
ec
ay
 
ra
te
 
(%
)
NDM1 ONDM1 ONDM2 NDM2 ONDM3
Sun only
-6.88
-4.66
-6.21
-9.55
-2.12
-
10
-
8
-
6
-
4
-
2
0
D
ec
ay
 
ra
te
 
(%
)
NDM1 ONDM1 ONDM2 NDM2 ONDM3
Overall
Annual subscription decay rates (%) - Top 5 Counties
Figure 4: Plots of the average year-on-year % decay rates in circulation shares across counties
within and outside the core market (between 2006-2011).
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Figure 5: Advertising at the focal newspaper
Month 1 corresponds to Jan 2006 and 72 to Dec 2011.
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Figure 6: Holdout sample validation for 2011 prices
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Figure 7: Marginal Costs
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Figure 8: Counterfactual Prices
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